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REVIEW OF RECENT VETERANS LAW
DECISIONS OF THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
ANGELA DRAKE,* YELENA DUTERTE** & STACEY RAE SIMCOX***
The last in-depth review of veterans law cases decided by the Federal Circuit
was published by the American University Law Review in 2015. Since that
time, the Federal Circuit has substantially changed procedural rules applicable
to veterans cases, including authorizing the use of the class action device and
clarifying the correct standard to use when challenging agency delay and
inaction. In an important case with wide application to administrative law
generally, the Federal Circuit addressed the issue of proper deference for agency
regulations and policies. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Kisor v.
Wilkie and reaffirmed principles articulated in Auer v. Robbins and Bowles
v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., articulating a new three-step analysis. With
regard to substantive developments in the area of veterans law, the Federal
Circuit reversed a prior 2008 decision and provided final and effective relief for
“Blue Water” Navy Veterans who have long fought for Agent Orange-related
benefits. It is a remarkable time to be a veterans advocate, and we are pleased to
provide this update.
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** Assistant Professor of Law and Director of the Veterans Legal Clinic, UIC John
Marshall Law School.
*** Director of the Veterans Law Institute and Veterans Advocacy Clinic, Stetson
University College of Law.
The authors would like to thank law students Justin Brickey at the University of
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Centola and the staff of the American University Law Review for including a discussion
of veterans law and the Federal Circuit in its 2019 Federal Circuit Symposium. And, a
special thanks to Professor Andrew Popper who was a patient and wonderful
moderator at the Symposium’s panel on veterans law.
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INTRODUCTION
In order to appreciate the significance of the cases discussed below,
a brief overview of federal veterans benefits law is beneficial. There are
three key features of this unique area of law to understand.
First, veterans benefits law is the creature of a robust federal statutory
and regulatory scheme. It is unlike any other adjudicatory system.
Indeed, “the contrast between ordinary civil litigation . . . and the
system that Congress created for the adjudication of veterans benefits
claims could hardly be more dramatic.”1 The system is uniquely proclaimant.2 Proceedings before the United States Department of
Veterans Affairs (VA) are informal and nonadversarial.3
Second, the VA is statutorily obligated to help the veteran by
developing evidence to support the claim and by giving the veteran the
benefit of the doubt in deciding the claim.4 The statutory “duty to
assist” includes providing a medical examination and/or obtaining a
medical opinion whenever such proof is necessary to make a decision
on the claim.5 Most significantly, in evaluating the evidence, the VA
must give the veteran the benefit of the doubt.6 By its very terms, this
evidentiary standard is far more lenient than other standards,
including “to a reasonable degree of medical certainty,” “beyond a
reasonable doubt,” or “by a preponderance of the evidence.”
Third, the VA struggles with high error rates that lead to substantial
delays for veterans. Prior to the 2017 Veterans Appeals Improvement
and Modernization Act (Appeals Modernization Act),7 benefits
1. Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428, 440 (2011).
2. See Hodge v. West, 155 F.3d 1356, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (finding that the
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and the United States Supreme
Court “both have long recognized that the character of the veterans’ benefits statutes
is strongly and uniquely pro-claimant”).
3. Id.
4. “The VA is charged with the responsibility of assisting veterans in developing
evidence that supports their claims . . . .” Henderson, 562 U.S. at 440; see 38 U.S.C.
§ 5103A(a) (2012) (“The Secretary shall make reasonable efforts to assist a claimant
in obtaining evidence necessary to substantiate the claimant’s claim for a benefit under
a law administered by the Secretary.”).
5. § 5103A(d)(1).
6. “When there is an approximate balance of positive and negative evidence
regarding any issue material to the determination of a matter, the Secretary shall give
the benefit of the doubt to the claimant.” § 5107(b); Henderson, 562 U.S. at 440.
7. Veteran Appeals Improvement and Modernization Act of 2017, 115 Pub. L.
No. 115-55, 131 Stat. 1105 (2017). It is too early to know whether this act has
successfully reduced average length of appeal.
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appeals took seven years on average, according to the VA’s own
statistics.8 One in fourteen veterans died while waiting for the
resolution of his or her appeal.9 Numerous reports by the Office of the
Inspector General have documented a myriad of problems in the
system, including the use of incompetent medical examiners for claims
involving traumatic brain injuries (TBI)—the signature wound of the
War on Terror;10 lost and missing claims documents;11 and erroneous
adjudication of military sexual trauma claims.12
I. BRIEF BACKGROUND ON THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR
VETERANS CLAIMS
Prior to 1988, decision making in the Department of Veterans Affairs
was a two-tiered administrative system. Decisions rendered by the VA’s
Board of Veterans Appeals (“the Board” or “Board”) were not subject
to judicial review. The Federal Circuit described this era in Gardner v.
Brown13 as one of “splendid isolation,” where Board decisions were free
from judicial scrutiny.14
The rationale underlying this freedom from judicial review was
based on the premise that the VA claims adjudication process should
remain nonadversarial in nature.15 Congress was concerned that
adding judicial review to the VA’s decisions (and, by implication,
attorneys to press veterans’ claims) would add an element of
antagonism into the system. This fear loomed large in every discussion
Congress had regarding changes in the system.16 Congressional

8. Ben Kesling, Hundreds of Thousands of Veterans’ Appeals Dragged out by Huge
Backlog, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 22, 2018, 7:00 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/hundreds
-of-thousands-of-veterans-appeals-dragged-out-by-huge-backlog-1534935600
[https://perma.cc/UZK5-XGCY].
9. Id.
10. DEP’T OF VETERAN AFF.: OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., REP. NO. 16-04558-249, VA
POLICY FOR ADMINISTERING TRAUMATIC BRAIN INJURY EXAMINATIONS i–ii (2018).
11. DEP’T OF VETERAN AFF.: OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., REPORT NO. 18-01214-157,
HEALTH INFORMATION MANAGEMENT MEDICAL DOCUMENTATION BACKLOG i–ii (2019).
12. DEP’T OF VETERAN AFF.: OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., REPORT NO. 17-05248-241, DENIED
POSTTRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER CLAIMS RELATED TO MILITARY SEXUAL TRAUMA i–ii (2018).
13. 5 F.3d 1456 (Fed. Cir. 1993), aff’d, 513 U.S. 115 (1994).
14. Id. at 1463 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 100-963, pt. 1, at 10 (1988)); see also Brown v.
Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 122 (1994).
15. Stacey-Rae Simcox, Thirty Years of Veterans Law: Welcome to the Wild West, 67 U.
KAN. L. REV. 513, 517 (2019).
16. Id. at 518.
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conversation on this subject lasted for over thirty-five years.17 Finally,
the general public’s concerns about the VA’s failing adjudication
system led to a compromise which allowed for the creation of a federal
court with the power to review the Board’s decisions.18
In 1988, President Reagan signed the Veterans’ Judicial Review Act19
into law, creating the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans
Claims (CAVC) as an Article I court.20 Currently, the CAVC has a total
of nine judges, each of whom serve for a fifteen-year term.21
The CAVC has exclusive jurisdiction to review decisions of the
Board.22 Specifically, the court may: (1) decide all relevant questions
of law; (2) interpret constitutional, statutory, and regulatory
provisions; (3) determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of
an action of the Secretary of Veterans Affairs (“the Secretary”); (4)
compel action of the Secretary unlawfully withheld or unreasonably
delayed; (5) hold unlawful and set aside decisions, findings,
conclusions, rules and regulations adopted by the Secretary or the
Board that are arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of discretion,
contrary to constitutional right, or in excess of statutory authority,
among other things; and (6) hold unlawful and set aside or reverse
clearly erroneous findings of material fact made by the VA.23
Limited appellate jurisdiction over CAVC decisions lies in the
Federal Circuit. The Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction to review
and decide any challenge to the validity or interpretation of any statute
or regulation and to interpret constitutional and statutory provisions
related to veterans’ claims.24 The Federal Circuit also has the authority

17. Lawrence B. Hagel & Michael P. Horan, Five Years Under the Veterans’ Judicial
Review Act: The VA Is Brought Kicking and Screaming into the World of Meaningful Due
Process, 46 ME. L. REV. 43, 44 (1994).
18. S. REP. NO. 100-418, at 30–31 (1988) (opening statement of Chairman Alan
Cranston, Senate Committee on Veterans’ Affairs).
19. Veterans’ Judicial Review Act, Pub. L. No. 100-687, § 301, 102 Stat. 4105 (1988).
20. Id. The CAVC was previously referred to as the Court of Veterans Appeals. See
generally Simcox, supra note 15, at 513–14.
21. 38 U.S.C. § 7253(a)–(c), (h)(5)(i)(1) (2012).
22. § 7252(a).
23. § 7261(a). The “clearly erroneous” standard differs slightly from the
Administrative Procedures Act’s “arbitrary and capricious” standard applied to
questions of fact. Marsh v. Or. Nat. Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 378 (1989) (referring
to 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1988)).
24. 38 U.S.C. § 7261(c).
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to set aside regulations and interpretations which are arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise unlawful.25
However, the Federal Circuit cannot review challenges to a factual
determination or to a law or regulation as applied to the facts of a particular
case, unless it presents a constitutional issue.26 The Federal Circuit does have
the authority to affirm, modify, remand, or reverse a decision of the CAVC.27
The Federal Circuit does not often make decisions in the area of
veterans law. However, when it does, the decision often impacts
hundreds of thousands of veterans. The Federal Circuit’s decisions can
overturn decades of case law in one fell swoop.
II. AUER DEFERENCE SURVIVES
Since the 2010 term, only one veterans law case, Kisor v. Wilkie,28 has
been decided by the Supreme Court of the United States. In Kisor, the
question presented to the Court was whether it should overrule Auer v.
Robbins29 and Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co.30 The Court did not
overrule Auer or Seminole Rock;31 instead it developed a more thorough
test to help courts review agency interpretation of the agency’s own
regulations.32 In her opinion, Justice Kagan acknowledged that, in the
past, the Supreme Court sent mixed messages regarding Auer
deference and clarification and guidance was in order.33
Before discussing the details of the Kisor opinion, Section II.A of this
Article will explain the history of Auer and Seminole Rock deference.
Then, Section II.B will discuss Kisor’s framework for future cases
involving issues relating to agency regulations.
A. The History of Auer Deference
Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co. preceded the Supreme Court’s
decision in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.34
by approximately four decades but did not offer any specific explanation

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Id. § 7261(d).
Id.
Id. § 7261(b).
No. 18-15, slip op. 1, 28–29 (2019).
519 U.S. 452 (1997).
325 U.S. 410 (1945).
Kisor, slip op. at 29.
Id.
Id.
467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984).
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for the circumstances requiring deference to an agency’s
interpretation of its own ambiguous regulation.35 In the most common
explanation of the Seminole Rock standard, an agency interpretation of
its own regulation is controlling unless its reading is plainly erroneous
or inconsistent with the regulation.36
In 1997, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the Court’s view of Seminole
Rock in Auer. In Auer, the petitioners were sergeants and lieutenants of
the St. Louis police force who were seeking payment for overtime pay
under the Federal Labor Standards Act.37 The St. Louis Board of Police
Commissioners argued that the petitioners were not entitled to
overtime pay because they fell under the “bona fide executive,
administrative, or professional” employee exemption in the federal
statute.38 Under the Department of Labor’s regulations, exempt status
is also measured by whether the employee is paid on a salary-basis.39
The officers argued they were not truly salaried employees, because
their income could be reduced based on disciplinary infractions.40
The Secretary of Labor, in an amicus curiae brief, interpreted the
salary-basis test articulated in the regulation to deny exempt status
where employees are covered by a policy that permits disciplinary or
deductions in pay as a practical matter.41 The Secretary of Labor
explained that if an actual practice or an employment policy created a
significant likelihood of a pay cut, the exemption would not apply.42 The
Court, with Justice Scalia writing, found that because this test is a creature
of the Secretary of Labor’s own regulations, its interpretation is controlling
unless plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.43
Since Auer, courts have followed Justice Scalia’s roadmap with regard
to agency interpretation of its own regulations.44 Specifically, courts
will defer to the agency’s interpretation of its own ambiguous
regulation, unless the interpretation is clearly erroneous.45 However,
since 2011, the Supreme Court has signaled increasing skepticism
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id.; see also Seminole Rock, 325 U.S. at 414.
Seminole Rock, 325 U.S. at 414.
Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997).
Id. at 455 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1)(1994)).
Id. at 461.
Id. at 462.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 461.
Id.
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about the future of Auer.46 Kisor created the perfect storm for the Court
to reconsider the two-decade Auer precedent.
B. Kisor Fails to Overturn Auer
The Supreme Court’s most recent foray into reexamining Auer arose
in the context of a veteran’s claim for disability compensation. In Kisor,
the Court was presented with the Secretary of the VA’s interpretation
of an ambiguous regulation, 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(c)(1), and the meaning
of the word “relevant” in the context of the case.47 The regulation
provides, “at any time after VA issues a decision on a claim, if VA
receives or associates with the claims file relevant official service
department records that existed and had not been associated with the
claims file when VA first decided the claim, VA will reconsider the
claim . . . .”48 Significantly, the regulation allows for the effective date
of the award of the benefits to date back to the submission of the
original claim if relevant official service department records are
associated with the file.49
The claimant, James Kisor, originally filed a claim for benefits in
1982 for post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).50 At that time, the VA
denied his claim because he lacked a diagnosis.51 In 2006, Mr. Kisor
reapplied and presented two new service records and a current
diagnosis.52 The VA granted the claim but established the effective date
for payment as 2006, not 1982.53 Mr. Kisor argued that the effective
date should be 1982, not 2006, because the records existed and were
46. See Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 568 U.S. 597, 617 (2013) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (“Two terms ago, in my separate concurrence in Talk America, I expressed
doubts about the validity of [Auer]. In that case, however, the agency’s interpretation
of the rule was also the fairest one, and no party had asked us to reconsider Auer.
Today, however, the Court’s deference to the Agency makes the difference (note the
Court’s defensive insistence that the Agency’s interpretation need not be ‘the best
one’). And respondent has asked us, if necessary, to ‘reconsider Auer.’ I believe that it
is time to do so.”) (citation omitted); Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 567
U.S. 142, 158–59 (2012); Talk Am., Inc. v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 564 U.S. 50, 69 (2011)
(Scalia, J., concurring).
47. Kisor v. Wilkie, No. 18-15, slip op. 1, 2 (2019).
48. 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(c)(1) (2019) (emphasis added).
49. Id. § 3.156(c)(3). The effective date of a claim may bear significantly on the value
of the claim and result in a substantial discrepancy in benefits awarded upon review.
50. Kisor, slip op. at 2.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
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not associated with his claim file at the VA. Mr. Kisor’s reading of the
regulation required the earlier effective date. Reviewing his argument,
the Board found that the later associated service records were not
“relevant” because they did not relate to the reason for the 1982
denial.54 Here, the agency’s interpretation of the regulation came
directly from the Board’s decision.55
At the Federal Circuit, the court determined Auer deference applied
to the Agency’s interpretation.56 Specifically, the Federal Circuit found
that the term “relevant” was ambiguous and determined that the
Board’s interpretation was not plainly erroneous or inconsistent.57 Mr.
Kisor appealed to the Supreme Court.58
At the Supreme Court, Mr. Kisor argued that Auer deference is a
violation of the separation of powers clause in the U.S. Constitution
because the governmental branch that makes the laws should not be
the one to also interpret the laws it makes.59 Mr. Kisor argued that if
deference to interpretation should be allowed, it should be based upon
a more formal manner of conveying a definition of the terms.60
According to Mr. Kisor, only those definitions which result from
Administrative Procedures Act61 (APA) notice and comment
procedures should be accepted by a court.62
The Solicitor General, perhaps sensing that the Court was
considering reviewing Auer, argued that Seminole Rock and Auer raise
significant concerns under the APA and lack clear historical
precedent.63 The government urged the Court to impose limits on
agency deference to force agencies to commit to better rule making,
stopping short of requesting the court to overrule Seminole Rock and
Auer completely. Overruling these cases would open the floodgates, as
thousands of cases relying on these precedents may have to be litigated
again.64 The government also argued that agency interpretation of its
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Kisor v. Shulkin, 869 F.3d 1360, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2017), vacated and remanded,
Kisor slip op. at 2424.
57. Id.
58. Kisor, slip op. at 3.
59. Id. at 19.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 22.
62. Id.
63. Brief of Respondent at 14, Kisor v. Wilkie, No 18-15 (2019).
64. Id.
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own regulation should only be considered when the interpretation
represents the view of the agency as a whole and not the view of a single
employee such as the Veterans Law Judge in Mr. Kisor’s case.65
In Kisor, the Supreme Court ultimately decided to uphold Auer
deference66 However, Kisor provides needed guidance for courts
presented with the important issues arising from agency interpretation
of its own regulations. Justice Kagan, writing for the Court, outlines a
three-step test.67 First, the court must determine whether there is genuine
ambiguity in the regulatory language.68 Second, if ambiguity exists, the
interpretation of the regulation must be a reasonable interpretation.69
Third, even if the interpretation is reasonable, the court must determine
whether that interpretation is entitled to controlling weight.70
With regard to the first step, the Supreme Court instructs lower
courts to exhaust all traditional rules of construction to determine
whether regulatory language is genuinely ambiguous.71 Although the
Court did not exhaustively describe these traditional tools, most courts
look to the natural reading or ordinary understanding of the disputed
word.72 Additionally, courts will look to the statutory context in which
the term is used and the original intent of the drafter or agency.73
If no ambiguity exists, a court should apply the plain meaning of the
word or phrase that is in dispute.74 Thus, courts do not have to give
deference to an agency’s interpretation of its own regulations if the
regulation is unambiguous.75
With regard to the second Kisor step, if a court finds a genuine
ambiguity in the regulatory language, a court must determine whether
the agency interpretation is reasonable.76 This framework is

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id. at 12, 27, 46.
Kisor, slip op. at 29.
Id. at 13–15.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See VALERIE BRANNON & JARED COLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44954, CHEVRON
DEFERENCE: A PRIMER 17 (2017) (describing judges’ methods of determining the
“natural reading” or “ordinary understanding” of the word at issue, including
reference to dictionaries).
73. Id.
74. Kisor, slip op. at 14.
75. Id.
76. Id.
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reminiscent of the Chevron analysis.77 If the interpretation is
unreasonable, a court does not need to give deference to the agency’s
interpretation.78 However, even if the interpretation is reasonable, a
court must still move to step three.79 This final step is the biggest shift
from the traditional Auer deference.
The third and final step requires a court to determine whether the
agency’s interpretation is entitled to controlling weight.80 There are
several factors a court should consider on this point, including whether
the interpretation is the agency’s official position, implicates the
agency’s substantive expertise, and shows fair and considered
judgment.81 Unlike Auer, Kisor allows the court to review the agency’s
process in creating its guidance and determine whether deference is
proper in that context.82
In light of the newly articulated test, the Supreme Court remanded
Kisor. On remand, the Federal Circuit must first determine whether
ambiguity actually exists as to the term “relevant.”83 If no ambiguity exists,
the analysis stops and the plain meaning would apply.84 If the term
“relevant” is ambiguous, the Federal Circuit must determine whether the
VA Secretary’s interpretation is reasonable.85 If unreasonable, the analysis
would stop and no deference would be afforded to the VA Secretary.86
However, if the Federal Circuit finds the interpretation reasonable, it
must analyze whether Congress would want the interpretation by the
Board of Veterans Appeals to be given deference as the agency’s
decision on the proper interpretation.87 In this regard, the Court
pointed out that the Board consists of 100 veteran law judges who
individually review cases.88 Further, the Court discussed that Board
decisions are of nonprecedential value.89 Given these facts, the
Supreme Court directed the Federal Circuit to determine whether the

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984).
Kisor, slip op. at 14.
Id. at 15.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 15–17.
Id. at 13.
Id. at 14.
Id. at 15.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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interpretation of regulatory language by this level of agency personnel
should be accorded deference under the new Kisor test.90
Looking forward, Kisor deference will likely lead to more robust
criticism and legal challenges to agencies and their interpretations of
their own regulations. Kisor will require courts to analyze how the
agency reached its interpretation, not simply rely on the agency’s
interpretation however made.
III. FEDERAL CIRCUIT’S REVIEW OF VA’S INTERNAL MANUAL, M21-1
In 2016, Disabled American Veterans (DAV) petitioned the Federal
Circuit to review a provision of the VA Adjudication Procedures Manual
M21-1 (“the M21”).91 As detailed below, the M21 is the VA’s internal
manual, used by adjudicators and cited by the Board on occasion.
DAV’s challenge arose from federal law that provides a presumption
for Persian Gulf veterans with a medically unexplained chronic
multisymptom illness (“MUCMI”).92 The VA regulations implementing
this law define a MUCMI as “a diagnosed illness without conclusive
pathophysiology or etiology.”93 However, in 2015, the VA changed the M21
to require both an inconclusive pathophysiology and an inconclusive
etiology to meet the definition of a MUCMI.94 Further, the amended
M21 added an example that provided that sleep apnea could not be a
MUCMI.95 Although many advocates agreed that the M21
misinterpreted the regulation, the Federal Circuit found that it did not
have jurisdiction to review the VA’s internal manual.96
In a separate case, Gray v. Secretary of Veterans Affairs,97 the veteran
petitioned the Federal Circuit to review a provision of the M21 related
to Agent Orange.98 Congress enacted statutes providing for
presumptive service connection for veterans who served in the
Republic of Vietnam during the Vietnam era and suffered from a
disease on the list of illnesses determined to be related to Agent

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id.
Disabled Am. Veterans v. Sec’y of Veterans Affairs, 859 F.3d 1072, 1074 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
38 U.S.C. § 1117 (2012).
38 C.F.R. § 3.317(a)(2)(ii) (2017).
Disabled Am. Veterans, 859 F.3d at 1074.
Id.
Id.
875 F.3d 1102, 1104 (Fed. Cir. 2017), vacated, 774 F. App’x 678 (2019).
Id.
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Orange exposure.99 In 2016, the VA updated the M21 to also exclude
veterans who served in bays, harbors, and ports of Vietnam.100 Again,
because the new interpretation is located in the VA’s internal manual,
the M21, the Federal Circuit found that it did not have jurisdiction to
review these policies.101
Before discussing the Federal Circuit’s conclusion that it lacked
jurisdiction to review the VA’s internal manual, Section III.A. of this
Article below will discuss in further detail the M21 and its use in the
VA’s system. Section III.B. will discuss prior Federal Circuit
jurisprudence relating to the judicial review of agency action. Finally,
Section III.C. will focus on the Court’s finding in Gray and its impact
on veterans law in the future.
A. The M21-1 Manual
The VA consolidates and explains its policies and procedures in an
internal manual, the M21.102 The M21 is not published in the Federal
Register or the Code of Federal Regulations.103 The VA explains, the
M21 is issued by the Chief Benefits Director and its provisions are
intended to provide uniform procedures for adjudication of claims.104
The M21 specifically provides guidance for Veterans Benefits
Administration (VBA) employees, who adjudicate claims and appeals.105
The VA has explicitly concluded that the M21 does not constitute the
instructions of the Secretary, and its provisions are not binding on the
Board.106 Further, the M21 is currently in electronic form and is
amended on a regular basis.107 As of November 20, 2019, the VA
changed the M21 365 times in 2019 alone.108

99. 38 U.S.C. § 1116(a) (2012).
100. Id.
101. Gray, 875 F.3d at 1104.
102. Disabled Am. Veterans v. Sec’y of Veterans Affairs, 859 F.3d 1072, 1074 (Fed.
Cir. 2017).
103. Id.
104. Vet. Aff. Op. Gen. Couns. Prec. 7-92 (1992) (internal quotations omitted).
105. Disabled Am. Veterans, 859 F.3d at 1074.
106. Id. at 1077.
107. M21-1 Changes by Date, U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFF., https://www.knowva.
ebenefits.va.gov/system/templates/selfservice/va_ssnew/help/customer/locale/enUS/portal/554400000001018/content/554400000100821/ Changes%20by%20Date
[https://perma.cc/BZA3-Z8VE].
108. Id.
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In the M21, the VA outlines the various steps that an adjudicator
must take in each case.109 For example, the M21 reviews how to classify
mail and what type of action should be taken when a piece of mail is
received, including prioritizing mail from Congress, action mail that
requires the VA to respond, and filing mail that does not necessitate a
response.110 However, Disabled American Veterans and Gray illustrate
situations in which the M21 is more than just a procedural manual and
negatively impacts a veteran’s rights under federal law.
B. The Federal Circuit’s Authority to Review the VA’s Actions
Under the APA, rules promulgated by an agency can be challenged.111
The APA requires agencies to publish certain rules in advance of their
effective date so that stakeholders can provide input on the
regulations.112 However, the APA does not apply to rules of procedure,
statements of general policy, and interpretations of general
applicability.113 Specifically, an interpretative rule is exempt from notice
and comment rulemaking.114 An interpretative rule simply indicates an
agency’s reading of a statute or a rule and does not create new rights
or remedies.115 As a result, the APA notice and comment provisions do
not apply if the policy is labeled “interpretive.”
Under 38 U.S.C. § 502, an action by the Secretary of the U.S.
Department of Veterans Affairs under § 552(a)(1) or § 553 of title 5 is
subject to judicial review directly to the Federal Circuit, bypassing the
CAVC.116 Section 552(a)(1) requires that all substantive rules of
general applicability and statements of general policy or interpretation
of general applicability must be published in the Federal Register.117
109. See generally M2–1 Adjudication Procedures Manual, U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFF.,
https://www.knowva.ebenefits.va.gov/system/templates/selfservice/va_ssnew/help/
customer/locale/en-US/portal/554400000001018/content/554400000073398/M211,%20Adjudication%20Procedures%20Manual,%20Table%20of%20Content
[https://perma.cc/648M-XH6M].
110. M21-1 III.ii.1.B.2.a, U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFF., https://www.knowva
.ebenefits.va.gov/system/templates/selfservice/va_ssnew/help/customer/locale/enUS/portal/554400000001018/content/554400000014111/M21-1,-Part-III,-Subpartii,-Chapter-1,-Section-B---Mail-Management [https://perma.cc/5ZA6-2Y54].
111. 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2012).
112. Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. West, 138 F.3d 1434, 1435 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
113. Id.
114. Splane v. West, 216 F.3d 1058, 1064 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
115. Id. at 1063.
116. 38 U.S.C. § 502.
117. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1)(D).
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Section 553 refers to agency rulemaking that must comply with notice
and comment procedures.118
Previously, the Federal Circuit reviewed a challenge to a Veterans
Health Administration directive because the directive was not
published for notice and comment in the Federal Register before
adoption, as required under § 553.119 Reviewing the directive under
§ 552(a)(1), the Federal Circuit explained that § 552(a)(1) does not
only require publication of substantive rules but also statements of
general policy and interpretations of general applicability.120 However,
rules created under § 552(a)(2) are exempt from judicial review under
38 U.S.C. § 502 because they are not published in the Federal
Register.121 Under § 552(a)(2), the statute allows agencies to publish
rules available for public inspection in electronic format, including
statements of policy and interpretation that have been adopted by the
agency but are not published in the Federal Register.122 Additionally,
administrative staff manuals and instructions to staff that affect a
member of the public are also not reviewable under § 502.123
Due to § 502’s limiting jurisdiction, the Federal Circuit can only
review those matters that are published in the Federal Register or rules
subject to notice and comment under § 553, unless the agency action
has the force of law.124 Several times in the past few years, the Federal
Circuit has addressed whether the provisions found in the M21 rise to
the level of a rule, reviewable under its jurisdiction.

118. § 553.
119. Preminger v. Sec’y of Veterans Aff., 632 F.3d 1345, 1347–49 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
(per curiam).
120. Id. at 1348–49.
121. 38 U.S.C. § 502.
122. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2).
123. 38 U.S.C. § 502.
124. Disabled Am. Veterans v. Sec’y of Veterans Aff., 859 F.3d 1072, 1077–78 (Fed.
Cir. 2017).
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C. Disabled American Veterans’ Lasting Impact on the Future of
Veterans Law
A million claims for benefits are filed every year with the VA.125 Of
the claims filed, only four to five percent are appealed to the Board.126
The M21 is essentially binding on at least ninety-five percent of claims
filed by veterans, since those veterans do not appeal to the Board.127
What makes this reality even more concerning is the Regional Office’s
rate of error.128 The Board overturns the Regional Office’s decision
74.56% of the time, by either granting the claim outright or remanding
the case back to the Regional Office, because the Regional Office
failed to comply with its duties.129
In Disabled American Veterans and Gray, the Federal Circuit explained
that because the M21 provisions are not binding on the Board, the
provisions do not have the force of law.130 The VA does not treat M21
provisions like regulations, and as a result, they are not published for
notice and comment. Thus, when the VA determines an interpretation of
a regulation, such as what the term “in the Republic of Vietnam” means,
and chooses to place that interpretation in the M21, the VA effectively
evades judicial review under the holding in Disabled American Veterans. While
the Gray certiorari petition was pending in the Supreme Court, the Federal
Circuit decided Procopio v. Wilkie,131 discussed below, mooting Gray.132
Due to Disabled American Veterans and Gray’s precedent, there is
currently no judicial review available to address incorrect or
inadequate guidance in the M21.133 Therefore, for each claim that is
filed with the Regional Office, the adjudicator is required to follow the

125. Cf. Veterans Benefits Administration Process One Millionth Claim in FY 2014, U.S.
DEP’T OF VETERANS AFF.: OFF. OF PUB. & INTERGOVERNMENTAL AFF., (July 14, 2014, 8:00
AM), https://www.va.gov/opa/pressrel/pressrelease.cfm?id=2582 [https://perma.cc
/ZAA9-A663] (announcing the VA’s projected processed claims as totaling 1.3 million
for Fiscal Year 2014, an increase of 200,000 over Fiscal Year 2013).
126. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFF., DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS (VA) STRATEGIC
PLAN TO TRANSFORM THE APPEAL PROCESS 11.
127. Id.
128. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFF. (VA) BOARD OF VETERANS’ APPEALS, ANNUAL REPORT
FISCAL YEAR (FY) 2018, at 31–33 (2019).
129. Id. at 31.
130. Disabled Am. Veterans v. Sec’y of Veterans Aff., 859 F.3d 1072, 1077 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
131. 913 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
132. Gray v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2764, 2764 (2019) (vacating and remanding Federal
Circuit Decision as moot).
133. Disabled Am. Veterans, 859 F.3d at 1072.
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M21, which may be inconsistent with the law.134 As discussed above,
many of these claims are on appeal for five to seven years before
reaching the Board which is the first adjudicative level not bound by
the M21’s guidance. In the future, a significant risk remains that the
VA will implement rules in the M21 that are inconsistent with statutes
and regulations, just as it did in Gray. Until reversed, Disabled American
Veterans and Gray allow the agency to forego drafting regulations and
simply add interpretive language into the M21, without the concern of
judicial review. This situation is unfortunate, given the special
solicitude imbued in federal veterans benefits law.135
IV. SIGNIFICANT SUBSTANTIVE LAW CHANGES FOR VIETNAM VETERANS
Recently, the Federal Circuit has decided significant cases that have
overturned decades of case law, impacting hundreds of thousands of
veterans. Two powerful examples of these changes are found in the
court’s decisions in Procopio v. Wilkie and Saunders v. Wilkie136 discussed
more fully below.
A. Blue Water Vietnam Veterans—Procopio v. Wilkie
In 1979, several Vietnam veterans and their families joined in a class
action suit against the makers of the herbicide referred to as “Agent
Orange.”137 Agent Orange was sprayed during the Vietnam War in
Vietnam and in other areas in order to clear the jungle of foliage,
improving visibility for American troops fighting the enemy.138 The
veterans involved in the Agent Orange litigation asserted exposure to
Agent Orange caused harmful conditions and diseases.139 In 1984, the
veterans and manufacturers settled the claims for $180 million dollars.140
In 1991, partially in response to the plight of Vietnam veterans and
partially in response to the possibility of a prolonged conflict in the
Middle East, Congress passed a statute that presumed veterans who
served “in the Republic of Vietnam” were exposed to Agent Orange.141
134. Id. at 1078.
135. See Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428, 440 (2011).
136. 886 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
137. In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740, 746 (E.D.N.Y. 1984),
aff’d, 818 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1987).
138. Id. at 775–76.
139. Id. at 764–75.
140. Id. at 863.
141. See 38 U.S.C. § 1116 (2012); 102 CONG. REC. 2360–61 (1991).

1360

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69:1343

Two years later, the VA finalized regulations to implement the statute.
In these regulations, the VA interpreted “in the Republic of Vietnam”
to include service “in the waters offshore” of Vietnam and service
requiring duty or visitation on land in the Republic of Vietnam.142 Because
the VA later believed that the regulation’s phrase “waters offshore” was
ambiguous, a 1997 VA General Counsel opinion interpreted “waters
offshore” to include only the inland waterways of Vietnam.143
While receiving presumptive exposure to Agent Orange was
relatively simple for Vietnam veterans who had stepped foot on the
landmass of Vietnam (described as “boots on the ground” by VA advocates)
this was not the case for veterans who had served on ships in the territorial
waters of Vietnam.144 These veterans were referred to as “Blue Water”
veterans in the open ocean, as opposed to the “Brown Water” veterans who
served on the inland waterways of Vietnam in shallower waters.145
In 2006, the CAVC issued a decision in the case of a Blue Water Navy
veteran, Jonathan Haas. In this case, the CAVC used the two-step test
found in the Supreme Court’s decision in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc.146:
First . . . is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the
precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the
end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give
effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If,
however, the court determines Congress has not directly addressed
the precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose its
own construction on the statute, as would be necessary in the
absence of an administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is
silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question
for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible
construction of the statute.147

Applying Chevron, the CAVC considered § 1116 and found the
phrase “in the Republic of Vietnam” ambiguous.148 Because the court
142. 38 C.F.R. § 3.307(a)(6) (1993).
143. Procopio v. Wilkie, 913 F.3d 1371, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (citing Gen. Counsel
Prec. 27-97 (July 23, 1997); 62 Fed. Reg. 63,603, 63,604 (Dec. 1, 1997)).
144. See, e.g., Gray v. McDonald, 27 Vet. App. 313, 316–17 (2015).
145. Id. at 317.
146. Recall that the Chevron analysis was utilized before Kisor’s recalibration of Auer
and Standing Rock deference. See infra Section I.B.
147. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43
(1984) (internal footnotes omitted).
148. Haas v. Nicholson, 20 Vet. App. 257, 269 (2006), rev’d sub nom, Haas v. Peake,
525 F.3d 1168 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
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found the statute ambiguous, it then turned to step two of the Chevron
test to determine if the VA’s interpretation of the phrase was reasonable
and entitled to deference.149 The CAVC found that the regulation “merely
has replaced statutory ambiguity with regulatory ambiguity” and reviewed
the VA’s interpretation of its regulation’s meaning through the lens of Auer
deference.150 In this review, the CAVC held that the VA’s interpretation of
the regulatory phrase “waters offshore” was “plainly erroneous” and could
be afforded no deference.151
In 2008, the Federal Circuit heard the Secretary of Veterans Affairs’
appeal of the CAVC’s decision and decided Haas v. Peake.152 The panel
decision, written by Judge Bryson, also applied the two-step test153
created by the Supreme Court in Chevron to determine whether or not
the VA’s interpretation was entitled to deference. The Federal Circuit
agreed with the CAVC that “[t]here are many ways in which to
interpret the boundaries of a sovereign nation such as the former
Republic of Vietnam” to include only the landmass, or a nation’s
“economic zone.”154 While the government supported the position that
§ 1116 was ambiguous concerning the meaning of “in the Republic of
Vietnam,” Mr. Haas argued that the phrase “in the Republic of
Vietnam” was clearly intended to include the “territorial waters off of
the landmass of Vietnam.”155 Mr. Haas pointed to two official
references, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea, which defined “Republic of Vietnam” to include the twelve
nautical miles off the shore of Vietnam.156 The court discussed the fact
that there were other definitions of “Republic of Vietnam” that did not
include the territorial waters off of the shore and that the legislative
history of the statute was unclear concerning the territorial waters.157
The court noted, “Congress did not indicate that service ‘in’ the
Republic of Vietnam included service on the waters offshore or in any
other location nearby.”158

149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

Id. at 269–70.
Id. at 269–71.
Id. at 269–70.
525 F.3d 1168 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
Id. at 1186.
Id. at 1184 (citing Haas, 20 Vet. App. at 263).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1184–85.
Id. at 1185.
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Mr. Haas also argued the legislative history behind § 1116 indicated
Congress’s clear intent to include presumptive service connection to
veterans who served in the offshore waters. The court disagreed with
this analysis of the legislative history.159 However, in light of the various
definitions of “in the Republic of Vietnam” that could be applicable,
the Federal Circuit agreed with the CAVC that the phrase “in the
Republic of Vietnam” was ambiguous.160
Having determined § 1116 was ambiguous, the Federal Circuit
turned to step two of the Chevron test. The Court analyzed whether the
VA’s interpretation of “in the Republic of Vietnam” to include only the
inland waterways of Vietnam was reasonable.161 In order to answer this
question, the court reviewed the VA’s interpretation of its own
regulations implementing § 1116. Specifically, the court looked at the
1993 formally adopted VA regulation interpreting “in the Republic of
Vietnam” to mean “waters offshore” and the General Counsel’s 1997
opinion defining “waters offshore” to include only the “inland
waterways of Vietnam.”162 The court began this review with a
consideration of Auer deference: that “an agency’s interpretation of its
own regulations is controlling unless plainly erroneous or inconsistent
with the regulations being interpreted” and that “substantial
deference” must be granted.163
The Federal Circuit acknowledged the concerns of the CAVC, which
had determined that the VA’s interpretation of its regulation was
“plainly erroneous,”164 and found that these concerns were not
significant enough to overcome Auer deference. Specifically, the CAVC
expressed concern that the VA’s interpretation and application of the
regulation was not consistent.165 The Federal Circuit agreed but found
that occasional inconsistency did not strip the agency of the deference
it was due under Auer.166 The CAVC also articulated a concern that the
VA’s interpretation of its regulation was riddled with flawed reasoning
159. Id.
160. Id. at 1186.
161. Id. at 1186.
162. Id. at 1180–82, 1186.
163. Id. at 1186 (citing Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158, 165
(2007) (internal quotations omitted); see also Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461–63
(1997); Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 (1994) (quoting
Gardebring v. Jenkins, 485 U.S. 415, 430 (1988)).
164. Haas, 525 F.3d at 1174.
165. Id. at 1187.
166. Id.
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leading to a “plainly erroneous” conclusion.167 The Federal Circuit
disagreed with this concern as well, stating that the court saw nothing
about the General Counsel’s opinion that “renders that
interpretation . . . plainly erroneous.”168 With regard to the CAVC’s
concern that the VA’s interpretation of its regulation was not the
product of “valid or thorough reasoning,”169 because of the lack of
scientific evidence supporting the “arbitrariness of the line-drawing
done by the agency,” the Federal Circuit remained unpersuaded.170
After a quick overview of only some of the scientific evidence available,
the Federal Circuit determined that the CAVC’s focus on the facts of Mr.
Haas’ case specifically had no bearing on a reasonable interpretation of
the meaning of the regulation as a whole.171 The Federal Circuit
contrasted the CAVC’s reasoning to the VA’s own interpretation which
the court considered a “plausible construction of the statutory
language . . . it is based on a simple but undisputed fact—that spraying
was done on land, not over the water.”172
From 2008 to 2019, the Haas case prevented Blue Water veterans from
benefitting from the Agent Orange presumptions and receiving VA
benefits for diseases caused by the herbicide. The landscape for the
surviving Blue Water Navy veterans changed dramatically when the Federal
Circuit overruled Haas in its 2019 en banc decision in Procopio v. Wilkie.173
Appellant, Alfred Procopio was a Navy veteran who served aboard
the U.S.S. Intrepid in the open waters near Vietnam in the 1960s.174
Mr. Procopio filed a claim with the VA for diabetes and prostate
cancer, two conditions on the Agent Orange list.175 The VA denied his
claims in 2009.176 The CAVC, in a single judge opinion, cited Haas and

167. Id. at 1191.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 1193.
171. Id. at 1194–95.
172. Id. at 1195. But see id. at 1197 (Fogel, J., dissenting) (agreeing that the statute
itself was ambiguous but finding the VA’s interpretation unreasonable).
173. 913 F.3d 1371, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
174. Id. at 1374.
175. Id. at 1371; see also U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, DISEASES ASSOCIATED WITH
AGENT ORANGE, https://www.publichealth.va.gov/exposures/publications/agentorange/agent-orange-summer-2015/agent-orange-presumptives.asp
[https://perma.cc/L25P-T9YE].
176. Procopio, 913 F.3d at 1374.
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found that a presumptive service-connection for Mr. Procopio was not
possible because he served in the territorial waters of Vietnam.177
Mr. Procopio appealed the case to the Federal Circuit and after two
oral arguments in 2018 before a panel of judges the court ordered an
en banc hearing.178 The court also ordered further briefing and
argument to specifically address two questions. First, “[d]oes the
phrase ‘served in the Republic of Vietnam’ . . . unambiguously include
service in offshore waters . . . ?” Second, “[w]hat role, if any, does the
pro-claimant canon play in this analysis?”179 Mr. Procopio’s supporters
filed fourteen amicus briefs to further aid him in his efforts.180
In its January 2019 decision, the Federal Circuit, stopping at stepone of the Chevron analysis, found that “the Haas court went astray when
it found ambiguity in § 1116 based on ‘competing methods of defining the
reaches of a sovereign nation.’”181 In coming to its conclusion, the court
conducted an overview of international law, beginning with Article 4 in the
1955 Geneva Convention which extended the military line of demarcation
for the Republic of Vietnam into the territorial waters.182 The court also
considered the 1958 United Nations Convention on the Territorial Sea and
the Contiguous Zone, which proposed that a country’s sovereignty extends
beyond inland waters and into the territorial seas.183 Additionally, the court
cited the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, a
convention considered and dismissed by the Haas court,184 which
recognized the territorial waters “having a breadth ‘not exceeding [twelve]
nautical miles.’”185 Because Congress ratified the convention that
extended the sovereignty of a nation beyond its landmass and into the
waters up to twelve nautical miles from shore, the court found that
Congress’s use of the term “in the Republic of Vietnam” was carefully
chosen and unambiguous186:

177. Procopio v. McDonald, No. 15–4082, 2016 WL 6816244, at *5 (Vet. App. Nov. 18,
2016), rev’d and remanded sub nom. Procopio v. Wilkie, 913 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
178. Procopio, 913 F.3d at 1374.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 1372–73.
181. Id. at 1380.
182. Id. at 1375.
183. Id. (citing Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, art.
1(1), Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639).
184. Id. at 1375–76; see also Haas v. Peake, 525 F.3d 1168, 1184 (Fed. Cir. 2008),
overruled by Procopio v. Wilkie, 913 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
185. Procopio, 913 F.3d at 1375–76.
186. Id. at 1376.

2020]

VETERANS LAW DECISIONS OF THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

1365

Congress chose to use the formal name of the country and invoke a
notion of territorial boundaries by stating that “service in the
Republic of Vietnam” is included. The intent of Congress is clear
from its use of the term “in the Republic of Vietnam,” which all
available international law unambiguously confirms includes its
territorial sea. Because we must “give effect to the unambiguously
expressed intent of Congress,” we do not reach Chevron step two.187

The Federal Circuit commented that because it had found that
congressional statutes were designed with a pro-veteran purpose, the
court did not need to reach a decision on whether the pro-veteran canon
of statutory interpretation referred to in Henderson ex rel. Henderson v.
Shinseki188 and Brown v. Gardner189 should be applied.190
Judge Lourie filed a concurrence, agreeing with the result but finding
§ 1116 was ambiguous, and explaining his view that the regulation
interpreting the statute was unreasonable because “waters offshore” meant
exactly that.191 Because Mr. Procopio served in the waters offshore, he was
entitled to the presumption of Agent Orange exposure.192 Judge O’Malley
also concurred, writing a robust support of the pro-veteran canon of
interpretation and its additional support for the majority’s decision.193
Judge Chen, joined by Judge Dyk, dissented. Judge Chen found that the
statute was ambiguous and argued that overruling Haas undermined stare
decisis with no support, such as a change in law.194 Judge Chen also
expressed concern that such a decision was imprudent due to Congress’s
contemporaneous consideration of a new statute regarding the issue of
veterans who served in the waters offshore of Vietnam.195 The Procopio
decision, Judge Chen pointed out, will result in a significant increased
budget for the VA that reflects a policy choice better left to Congress.196 As
to the pro-veteran canon, Judge Chen commented that it had never been

187. Id. at 1375.
188. 562 U.S. 428, 441 (2011).
189. 513 U.S. 115, 117–18 (1994).
190. Procopio, 913 F.3d at 1380 (citing Henderson, 562 U.S. 428 (2011); Brown, 513
U.S. 115, 117–18 (1994)).
191. Id. at 1381 (Lourie, J., concurring).
192. Id.
193. Id. at 1382 (O’Malley, J., concurring).
194. Id. at 1388–89 (Chen, J., dissenting).
195. Id. at 1394–95.
196. Id.
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applied before to Chevron step one analysis and was not sufficient to
convert an “ambiguous statute into an unambiguous one.”197
In March 2019, VA Secretary Wilkie indicated that the VA would not
be seeking review of the Procopio decision by the Supreme Court.198
B. Aftermath of Procopio
Spurred to action by the Procopio decision, Congress passed the Blue
Water Navy Vietnam Veterans Act of 2019199 (“the Act”) in June of
2019.200 Congress debated the passage of this bill for years, concerned
about the impact of opening the class of Vietnam veterans entitled to
a presumptive exposure to Agent Orange to Blue Water Sailors. The
budgetary impact was substantial: an estimated $280 million over the
next ten years in disability benefits alone.201 The VA asserted that up to
560,000 veterans could be eligible for benefits under the new Act,
including almost 38,000 Blue Water Vietnam veterans who had
previously been denied benefits.202
Section 2 of the Act grants presumptive exposure to veterans serving
offshore of the coast of Vietnam “not more than [twelve] nautical miles
seaward of a line commencing on the southwestern demarcation line
of the waters of Vietnam and Cambodia and intersecting” at eleven

197. Id. at 1394 (J. Chen, J., dissenting).
198. Nikki Wentling, VA Secretary Recommends DOJ Not Challenge Ruling on “Blue
Water” Benefits, STARS & STRIPES (Mar. 26, 2019), https://www.stripes.com/va-secretaryrecommends-doj-not-challenge-ruling-on-blue-water-benefits-1.574387
[https://perma.cc/GH6S-S55B].
199. Pub. L. No. 116–23, 133 Stat. 966 (2019).
200. Id.; see also Leo Shane III, ‘Blue Water’ Veterans Bill Clears Senate, Heads to White
House for Final Signature, MIL. TIMES (June 12, 2019), https://www.militarytimes.com/
news/pentagon-congress/2019/06/12/blue-water-veterans-bill-clears-senate-heads-towhite-house-for-final-signature [https://perma.cc/NLA8-92K6].
201. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, H.R. 299, BLUE WATER NAVY VIETNAM VETERANS ACT
OF 2019: AS REPORTED BY THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON VETERANS’ AFFAIRS ON MAY 10, 2019
6 (2019), https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2019-05/hr299.pdf [https://perma.cc/
AMS9-PXLA]; Amanda Dolasinski, Blue Water Navy Bill Stalls in Senate, but Fight
Continues, MIL. OFFICERS ASS’N AM. (Dec. 11, 2018) https://www.moaa.org/
content/publications-and-media/news-articles/2018-news-articles/blue-water-navybill-stalls-in-senate,-but-fight-continues [https://perma.cc/J8T3-UBX8].
202. Appendix for Respondent’s Brief at 86, Procopio v. Sec’y of Veterans Affairs,
943 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (No. 19–2184); VA Extends Agent Orange Presumption to
“Blue Water Navy” Veterans, U.S. DEP’T VETERANS AFF.: VANTAGE POINT (July 8, 2019),
https://www.blogs.va.gov/VAntage/62832/va-extends-agent-orange-presumptionblue-water-navy-veterans [https://perma.cc/YL75-7LPL].
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different longitudinal and latitudinal points.203 The Act also provides
benefits for veterans who served in Korea and the children of
American veterans stationed in Thailand who were exposed to Agent
Orange during the Vietnam War.204 Section 3(c)(3) of the Act allowed
the Secretary to place a stay on pending claims until the law took full
effect on January 1, 2020 or until the Secretary could implement
regulations relating to the statute.205 The VA Secretary implemented a
stay on July 1, 2019, citing the authority granted to him under the
Act.206 Two-hundred cases had been decided under Procopio between
April 1 and June 30 of 2019.207
In July 2019, Mr. Procopio filed a petition for review before the
Federal Circuit arguing that the Secretary’s stay of his case was
improper because the Secretary’s authority to stay cases would not
begin until the law took effect in January 2020.208 Therefore, Mr.
Procopio argued, his case should be decided under 38 U.S.C. § 1116
and the court’s decision in Procopio immediately—regardless of the stay
on claims brought under the new Act.209 The court determined that
the Secretary’s stay amounted to an “interpretation of general
applicability formulated and adopted by the agency” under 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(a)(1)(D)and that the Blue Water Act “unambiguously
authorizes” him to issue the stay.210 The court also found that the
authority to stay extended to pending claims pursuant to § 1116 and
ultimately denied the petition for review.211
C. Overturning Twenty Years of Case Law: Saunders v. Wilkie
In 2018, the Federal Circuit made another sweeping decision in
Saunders v. Wilkie, overturning twenty years of case law at the CAVC.
Saunders changed the way the VA must define a “disability.”

203. Blue Water Navy Vietnam Veterans Act of 2019, Pub. L. No. 116–23, § 2(d)
(2019) (to be codified in 38 U.S.C. § 1116A(d)).
204. Id. §§ 3–4.
205. Id. § 3(c)(3)(B).
206. Appendix for Petitioner’s Brief at 1, Procopio v. Sec’y of Veterans Affairs, No.
19--2184 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
207. Id. at 4.
208. Petitioner’s Brief at 16, 27, Procopio v. Sec’y of Veterans Affairs, 943 F.3d 1376
(Fed. Cir. 2019) (No. 19–2184).
209. Id. at 16–18.
210. Procopio v. Sec’y of Veterans Affairs, 943 F.3d 1376, 1377, 1380–81 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
211. Id. at 1382.
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The roots of the Saunders decision are found in the 1999 CAVC
decision in Sanchez-Benitez v. West212 (“Sanchez-Benitez I”) and the
subsequent 2001 Federal Circuit decision213 (“Sanchez-Benitez II”).
In Sanchez-Benitez I, the CAVC considered the issue of whether pain,
without an accompanying diagnosis, met the requirements of a
“disability” which can be compensated under federal benefits law. 38
U.S.C. §§ 1110 and 1131 provide for compensation for disabilities
incurred during wartime or peacetime where the disability results from
personal injury or disease contracted in the line of duty. 214
The veteran, Jose Sanchez-Benitez, filed a disability claim for chronic
neck pain, even though no formal diagnosis existed, and the VA
denied his claim.215 On appeal, the CAVC acknowledged that VA
regulations require pain to be considered in the severity of rating a
disability but held that “pain alone, without a diagnosed or identifiable
underlying malady or condition, does not in and of itself constitute a
disability for which service connection may be granted.”216
On appeal to the Federal Circuit, Mr. Sanchez-Benitez directly
challenged the CAVC’s holding regarding pain.217 The court discussed
Mr. Sanchez-Benitez’ challenge after a summation of the CAVC’s
reasoning in denying his claim:
His argument is that under the basic disability statutes, pain alone is
a compensable disability, even if the pain cannot be attributed to any
current disability. Thus, under Mr. Sanchez-Benitez’s view, a veteran
who is currently suffering from pain, but who cannot attribute the
pain to any particular disability, is nonetheless compensibly disabled.
Mr. Sanchez-Benitez presents an interesting, indeed perplexing,
question, but not one that we need or can decide in this appeal. Even
assuming arguendo that free-standing pain wholly unrelated to any
current disability is a compensable disability, such pain cannot be
compensable in the absence of proof of an in-service disease or injury
to which the current pain can be connected by medical evidence.
Such a “pain alone” claim must fail when there is no sufficient factual
showing that the pain derives from an in-service disease or injury.218

212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.

Sanchez-Benitez v. West (Sanchez-Benitez I), 13 Vet. App. 282 (1999).
Sanchez-Benitez v. Principi (Sanchez-Benitez II), 259 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
38 U.S.C. §§ 1110, 1131 (2012).
Sanchez-Benitez I, 13 Vet. App. at 283–84.
Id. at 285.
Sanchez-Benitez II, 259 F.3d at 1360.
Id. at 1361–62.
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Rather than issue a holding regarding whether pain alone equates
to a “disability,” the Federal Circuit found that there was no medical
nexus to support the contention that Mr. Benitez-Sanchez’s pain was
due to the trauma he incurred in service, so Mr. Benitez-Sanchez could
not state a claim.219 The court reiterated the judgment of the CAVC in
this case “rests on alternative grounds: the failure of proof of medical
connection of current pain to the alleged in-service neck trauma
incident, and the statement in the [CAVC’s] opinion that ‘pain alone’
is not compensable.”220
In the two decades following the litigation of Mr. Sanchez-Benitez’s
claims, the CAVC applied the holding that “pain alone” is not a
disability from its 1999 Sanchez-Benitez I over one-hundred times. These
denials included the case, Saunders v. McDonald.221
In 2008, Melba Saunders filed a claim for chronic knee pain.222 A VA
medical examiner found that there was no pathology to diagnose the
source of Ms. Saunders’s knee pain but then gave an opinion that her
knee pain was related to her active duty service.223 The Board of
Veterans’ Appeals denied Ms. Saunders’s claim basing its decision on
Sanchez-Benitez I that pain alone without an underlying condition is not
a compensable disability.224
Ms. Saunders appealed to the CAVC arguing that the language in
Sanchez-Benitez I was “dicta.”225 In its opinion, the CAVC criticized Ms.
Saunders’s contention in a lengthy single judge opinion on the issue.226
The court noted that what Ms. Saunders characterized as dicta was
actually prefaced by the word “holds” making it clear the court was
establishing precedent.227 The CAVC then tackled Ms. Saunders’s
argument that “it does not matter what the panel thought it was doing
or intended to do because the [Federal Circuit] implicitly converted
the Court’s precedential statement into dicta.”228 The CAVC discussed
the Federal Circuit’s acknowledgement in Sanchez-Benitez II that the
219. Sanchez-Benitez II, 259 F.3d 1356, 1361–62 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
220. Id. at 1362.
221. Saunders v. McDonald, No. 15-0975, 2016 WL 3002862, at *1 (Vet. App. May
25, 2016), rev’d, 886 F.3d. 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
222. Id. at *1.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id. at *2.
226. Id. at *3.
227. Id. at *2.
228. Id.
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CAVC’s Sanchez-Benitez I decision rested on alternative grounds to
include the issue of whether pain alone was a compensable disability.229
The CAVC determined that the Federal Circuit’s “explicit recognition
that this Court had decided an important legal issue establishes that the
Court’s conclusion was, on its face, not dicta.”230 The CAVC goes on to
note that there is “no rule stating that if the Federal Circuit affirms this
Court under one of two alternative bases the Court gave for its decision,
then the other basis for its decision is converted to dicta.”231
To underscore the importance of its Sanchez-Benitez I holding while
denying Ms. Saunders’s claim for knee pain, the CAVC added:
The portion of Sanchez-Benitez that is dispositive in this case is about
as settled as caselaw can be. Most importantly, no one, to the Court’s
knowledge, has ever suggested that the rule applied by the Board
here is dicta. Throughout the nearly two decades since the rule
stated in Sanchez-Benitez was written, the Court has unfailingly
deemed it to be good precedential authority . . . It doesn’t take
much reading between the lines to realize that the appellant wishes
to neutralize Sanchez-Benitez without going through the arduous steps
necessary to convince this Court or the one above to overturn
longstanding precedent.232

A panel of the CAVC adopted the single-judge opinion issued in
Saunders after finding no legal error in the reasoning of the judge.233
Ms. Saunders appealed the CAVC decision. In 2018, the Federal
Circuit issued its decision in Saunders v. Wilkie.234 Judge O’Malley,
writing for a three-judge panel which included Judges Newman and
Dyk, held that “the [CAVC] erred as a matter of law in finding that
Saunders’s pain alone, absent a specific diagnosis or otherwise
identified disease or injury, cannot constitute a disability under 38
U.S.C. § 1110 (2016).”235 When discussing the issue of pain alone as a
compensable disability, the Federal Circuit began its discussion by
noting that Ms. Saunders’ case is not impacted by Sanchez-Benitez II
because the panel that decided that case made no decision on the

229. Id.
230. Id. at *3.
231. Id.
232. Id. at *4, 6.
233. Saunders v. McDonald (Saunders II), No. 15-0975, 2016 WL 4258493, at *1 (Vet.
App. Aug. 12, 2016), rev’d, 886 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
234. 886 F.3d. 1356, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
235. Id.
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CAVC’s earlier holding regarding pain alone as a disability.236 The
court then explained “we characterized as dicta the very holding in
Sanchez-Benitez I that is at issue here.”237 Criticizing the holding of
Sanchez-Benitez I, the Federal Circuit found that the CAVC offered no
support for its contention that pain alone cannot qualify as a disability.
The Federal Circuit found the CAVC read the provisions of § 1110 out
of context with the other statutes regarding functional impairment,
thus rendering the CAVC’s interpretation of disability “illogical.”238
After outright dismissing any precedential value arising from
Sanchez-Benitez I and Sanchez-Benitez II, the Federal Circuit then
analyzed the meaning of the term “disability” in 38 U.S.C. § 1110 and
determined the word means a “functional impairment of earning
capacity, not the underlying cause of said disability.”239 The Federal
Circuit held that because pain can diminish bodily function, “pain
need not be diagnosed as connected to a current underlying condition
to function as an impairment.”240 In one sentence referring to the
holding of Sanchez-Benitez I as dicta, which may not have been entirely
clear from the Sanchez-Benitez II opinion as evidenced by the CAVC’s
later reliance on its original holding, the Federal Circuit overturned
two decades of case law at the CAVC with the stroke of a pen. The
entire impact of Saunders will take several years to measure as the VA
implements the Federal Circuit’s opinion and teaches it to the lowestlevel decision makers. However, the wide-sweeping change in the
definition of “disability” cannot be overstated.
V. ADDRESSING DELAYS IN THE VA SYSTEM
Under the All Writs Act,241 Article I courts may issue writs necessary
or appropriate in aid of their jurisdictions. With respect to mandamus
petitions alleging unreasonable delay, “[b]ecause the statutory
obligation of a Court of Appeals to review on the merits may be
defeated by an agency that fails to resolve disputes, a Circuit Court may
resolve claims of unreasonable delay in order to protect its future
jurisdiction.”242 With regard to the CAVC specifically, its jurisdictional
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.

Id. at 1361–62.
Id.
Id. at 1355–56.
Id. at 1363.
Id. at 1364.
28 U.S.C. § 1651 (2012).
Telecomms. Research & Action Ctr. v. FCC (TRAC), 750 F.2d 70, 76 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
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statute, 38 U.S.C. § 7261(a)(2), provides that the CAVC may, “to the
extent necessary to its decision . . . compel action of the Secretary
unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed.”243
Like many veterans before them, the nine appellants in the Martin
v. O’Rourke244 case petitioned the CAVC to issue writs of mandamus in
response to alleged unreasonable delays.245 The veterans alleged the
delays in their cases constituted a violation of their rights under the Due
Process Clause.246 In Martin, the Federal Circuit determined the CAVC
used the wrong standard to measure unreasonable delay when it used
the test first articulated by the CAVC in Costanza v. West247 in 1999.248
In Costanza, the veteran asserted that the VA’s delay in certifying his appeal
to the Board, a ministerial act, took too long when almost one year had
transpired from the date he filed his appeal.249 The CAVC, in Martin, denied
the writ, stating, that when a petition is based on such a delay, the Court’s
precedents support the veteran’s right to such a writ when the veteran
demonstrates the alleged delay is tantamount to the Secretary’s arbitrary
refusal to act, bearing in mind the demands on the Secretary’s resources.250
In rejecting the standard described in Costanza, the Federal Circuit
found “[t]here is little to be said about this standard’s origin.”251
Accepting the appellants’ suggestion, the Federal Circuit found the
analysis set out in the D.C. Circuit’s 1984 decision in Telecommunications
Research & Action Center v. FCC252 (TRAC) “provides a more balanced
approach because it requires consideration of the veterans’ interests
and does not require a showing of intent.”253 Given the adoption of
TRAC, the Federal Circuit concluded that if the CAVC finds the delay
unreasonable under TRAC, it need not conduct a separate due process
analysis.254 The Federal Circuit remanded the claims that were not

243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.

38 U.S.C. § 7261(a)(2).
891 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
Id. at 1340.
Id. at 1342.
12 Vet. App. 133 (1999).
Martin, 891 F.3d at 1344.
Costanza, 12 Vet. App. at 134.
Martin, 891 F.3d at 1344 (citing Ribavdo v. Nicholson 20 Vet. App. 552, 555 (2007)).
Id.
750 F.2d 70 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
Martin, 891 F.3d at 1345.
Id. at 1348–49.
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mooted by the VA during the pendency of the appeal to the CAVC for
the proper analysis under TRAC.255
TRAC outlines a six-factor test for analyzing a claim of unreasonable delay
to determine “whether the agency’s delay is so egregious as to warrant
mandamus.”256 The factors include the following:
1. the time agencies take to make decisions must be governed by a “rule of
reason;”
2. where Congress has provided a timetable or other indication of the speed
with which it expects the agency to proceed in the enabling statute, that statutory
scheme may supply content for this rule of reason;
3. delays that might be reasonable in the sphere of economic regulation are
less tolerable when human health and welfare are at stake;
4. the court should consider the effect of expediting delayed action on agency
activities of a higher or competing priority;
5. the court should also take into account the nature and extent of the
interests prejudiced by delay; and
6. the court need not “find any impropriety lurking behind agency lassitude
in order to hold that agency action is ‘unreasonably delayed.’”257

The CAVC has relied on Martin many times in the past year,
especially in its single-judge opinions disposing of writs. In the 100
post-Martin CAVC cases addressing unreasonable delay (through
February 29, 2020) all were denied except one: Godsey v. Wilkie.258
These denials often recite the language in Martin that a delay may be
the result of the VA following its statutory duty to assist and not a result
of agency inaction, without deep analysis.259
Only two CAVC precedential panel decisions have addressed Martin.
Godsey v. Wilkie, discussed further below, certified a class where claimants
experienced unreasonable delay with regard to certain ministerial acts in
the appeals process, ironically almost identical to the challenge in Costanza

255. Id. at 1349. See Monk v. Shulkin (Monk II), 855 F.3d 1312, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2017)
(noting that the VA’s action on certain claims rendered those claims moot).
256. TRAC, 750 F.2d at 80.
257. Id. (internal citations omitted).
258. 31 Vet. App. 207 (2019) [discussed below in Section VI. D.].
259. See, e.g., Bowlin v. Wilkie, No. 19-2576, 2019 WL 3307851, at *2 (Vet. App. July
24, 2019) (denying veterans claim as moot despite multi-year delay and no TRAC
analysis); Cantrell v. Wilkie, No. 19-1559, 2019 WL 2426166, at *2–3 n.1 (Vet. App.
June 11, 2019) (finding that, despite no TRAC analysis, the veteran had not exhausted
available remedies and was, therefore, not entitled to writ); Sorkness v. Wilkie, No. 182611, 2018 WL 4408980, at *3 (Vet. App. Sept. 17, 2018) (finding no egregious delay).
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twenty years earlier.260 In the other panel decision, Monk v. Wilkie,261 the
CAVC denied a petition for extraordinary relief.262
In Monk v. Wilkie (Monk IV), the CAVC highlighted the absence of a
“hard and fast rule with respect to the point in time at which delay [in
the adjudication of VA claims] becomes unreasonable.”263 It explained
that Martin states that the “rule of reason” requires a review of “the
particular agency action for which unreasonable delay is alleged” and
an evaluation of the reasonableness of the delay given the specific
factual circumstance before the court.264 Accordingly, various factors
inform the reasonableness inquiry and “more complex and substantive
agency actions take longer than purely ministerial ones.”265
With regard to the six petitioners in Monk IV, the CAVC found that
all but one, William Dolphin, had withdrawn their claims or their
claims were moot due to VA action.266 For Mr. Dolphin’s situation in
particular, the CAVC attributed the delay in the VA’s adjudication of
his claims to the fulfillment of substantive agency actions to comply
with statutory duties.267 The CAVC cited several details in Mr. Dolphin’s
claims history, from his sixty-page transcript to the submission of more
than 1600 pages of military and medical records to the ten additional
medical examinations to evaluate PTSD, TBI, seizures, headaches,
peripheral nerves, lower back and shoulder pain, hearing loss, heart
disease, and diabetes claims.268 The CAVC’s decision focused on the
VA’s last action in the appeal, not the totality of the time Mr. Dolphin’s

260. Id. at 215.
261. 32 Vet. App. 87 (2019) [currently on appeal as Federal Circuit Case No. 20-1305].
262. Id. at *14. The Monk case has led to several reported opinions at the CAVC and
Federal Circuit levels. The nomenclature used by the CAVC in its October 2019 order
will be used in this Article. See, e.g., Monk v. McDonald (Monk I), No. 15-1280, 2015
WL 3407451 (Vet. App. May 27, 2015) (CAVC’s decision denying class certification);
Monk v. Shulkin (Monk II), 855 F.3d 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (authorizing the use of the
class action device); Monk v. Wilkie (Monk III), 30 Vet. App. 167 (2018) (CAVC’s
decision to deny class certification following remand); Monk v. Wilkie (Monk IV), 32
Vet. App. 87 (2019).
263. Monk IV, 32 Vet. App. at 102 (quoting Martin v. O’Rourke, 891 F.3d 1338, 1346
(Fed. Cir. 2018)).
264. Id. at 111 (Allen, J., concurring in part) (quoting Martin, 891 F.3d at 1345).
265. Martin, 891 F.3d at 1345–46.
266. Monk IV, 32 Vet. App. at 93, 97 (following the remand from the Federal Circuit
an amended writ petition was filed naming an additional six class representatives,
including Mr. William Dolphin).
267. Id. at 103.
268. Id.
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case was pending, which was over five years. In his dissent, Judge Allen
criticized the majority’s “slicing and dicing” analysis of Mr. Dolphin’s VA
“odyssey.”269 He highlighted that under the majority’s analysis, and the VA’s
concession at oral argument, even a delay of 100 years would satisfy TRAC
factor one.270 This decision is currently on appeal at the Federal Circuit.271
Accordingly, while Martin is helpful to the extent that it provides a
broader and a more favorable analysis for veterans considering filing a
petition requesting a writ of mandamus, the end results appear to be
the same as under the Costanza test, where writs were not granted.
Martin is important not only for the adoption of the TRAC analysis,
but also because of Judge Moore’s powerful concurrence which should
be required reading for every American. She notes that the appeals
process “takes over five and a half years on average from the time a
notice of disagreement is filed until the Board issues a decision, which
often sets the stage for more proceedings on remand.”272 She reminds
us that during this uncertain process, veterans may be lacking daily
necessities, including food and shelter.273 This deprivation occurs
when years later these same veterans are found to be entitled to the
funds.274 Noting that three of the veterans in the nine cases before the
court in Martin died while their appeal was pending, Judge Moore
reminds us that it is up to the courts to protect these individuals,
concluding with this call to action:
The men and women in these cases protected this country and the
freedoms we hold dear; they were disabled in the service of their
country; the least we can do is properly resolve their disability claims
so that they have the food and shelter necessary for survival. It takes
on average six and a half years for a veteran to challenge a VBA
determination and get a decision on remand. God help this nation
if it took that long for these brave men and women to answer the call
to serve and protect. We owe them more.275

269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.

Id. at 108, 112 (Allen, J., dissenting in part).
Id. at 112.
Brief for Petitioner, Monk v. Wilkie, No. 20-1305 (Fed. Cir. 2020).
Martin v. O’Rourke, 891 F.3d 1338, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (Moore, J., concurring).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1352.

1376

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69:1343

VI. CLASS ACTIONS: AGGREGATE PROCEDURE IN VETERANS CASES
A. Background to the Federal Circuit Appeal
The Federal Circuit has handed down several instrumental decisions
in the area of class action litigation. One such case is the Monk line of
cases. Conley Monk served in the United States Marine Corps during
the Vietnam War.276 He later suffered from several disabilities that he
believed to be related to his military service, including PTSD.277 He
filed a claim with the VA in February of 2012.278
In 2013, the VA notified Mr. Monk that it denied his claims because
his discharge was “other than honorable.”279 Mr. Monk timely appealed
this decision by filing the proper form, known as a Notice of
Disagreement (NOD), within one year of the denial.280 A hearing took
place in February 2014.281
More than one year later, in March 2015, Mr. Monk learned from
his congresswoman that the VA would not process his appeal until it
received records from the Board of Corrections for Naval Records
(BCNR) regarding his discharge status.282
Mr. Monk then filed a petition for a writ for mandamus at the CAVC,
asserting that the delay the VA took in deciding his claim was
unreasonable and asking the CAVC to compel action.283 He sought
class certification on behalf of all similarly situated veterans.284 His
proposed class included all veterans who had applied for VA benefits,
had timely filed an NOD, had not received a decision within twelve
months, and had demonstrated medical or financial hardship as

276. Monk v. Shulkin (Monk II), 855 F.3d 1312, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id.; see, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Defense, MCO 1900.16, Separation and Retirement
Manual, ¶ 1003(2)(c)(2015) (An “other than honorable” discharge is the appropriate
form of separation when a Marine commits an act or omission that “constitutes a
significant departure from the conduct expected from a Marine”).
280. Monk II, 855 F.3d at 1314.
281. Id. (mentioning that separately Mr. Monk applied to the Board of Correction
of Naval Records (BCNR) to upgrade his discharge status).
282. Opening Brief of Claimant-Appellant at 12–13, Monk v. McDonald (Monk I), No. 151280, 2015 WL 6388290 (Vet. App. May 27, 2015) (stating the actual dates of the steps in the
adjudication of Monk’s claims were found in Appellant’s Brief to the Federal Circuit).
283. Monk I, 15-1280, 2015 WL 3407451, at *2.
284. Id.
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defined by 38 U.S.C. §§ 7107(a)(2)(B)–(C).285 Mr. Monk asserted that
the All Writs Act provides authority for the CAVC to aggregate cases.286
On May 27, 2015, the CAVC refused to grant class certification,
finding it lacked authority to certify a class.287 On July 8, 2015, the
CAVC issued an order denying Mr. Monk’s individual petition for
mandamus relief.288 It found that the VA’s delay in adjudicating Mr.
Monk’s disability claim resulted, at least in part, from the VA’s need
for certain BCNR records.289
B. The Federal Circuit Decision
The Federal Circuit appeal focused solely on the issue of whether
the CAVC had the authority to entertain class actions. During the
pendency of the proceedings, the VA had determined that Mr. Monk was
entitled to receive VA benefits at the one hundred percent level,
rendering the underlying issue of delay moot.290 Interestingly, the VA
Secretary conceded in oral argument that the CAVC in fact had authority
to handle class actions but asserted Mr. Monk’s claim was moot, and the
requested class was not proper for class action treatment.291
The Federal Circuit first determined that the VA’s grant of benefits
during the course of the proceedings did not moot the request for class
certification.292 Relying upon United States Parole Commission v.
Geraghty293 and Genesis HealthCare Corp. v. Symczyk,294 both Supreme
Court cases addressing mootness in class actions, the Federal Circuit
found it significant that Mr. Monk’s claim was granted after his request
for class certification was made and denied.295 The Federal Circuit also
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. Id. at *3 (citing prior CAVC decisions where the court found it lacked authority
to certify class actions including Am. Legion v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 1, 3–4 (2007);
Henderson v. Brown, 10 Vet. App. 272, 278 (1997) (per curiam); Harrison v.
Derwinksi, 1 Vet. App. 438, 439 (1991) (en banc); Lefkowitz v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App.
439, 440 (1991) (per curiam)).
288. Monk v. McDonald, No. 15-1280, 2015 WL 4139012, at *3 (Vet. App. July 8,
2015), rev’d and remanded sub nom. Monk v. Shulkin, 855 F.3d 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
289. Id.
290. Id. at 1316.
291. Oral Arg. at 14:40–20:19, 22:58–23:07, Monk II, 855 F.3d 1312 (2017),
http://oralarguments.cafc.uscourts.gov/default.aspx?fl=2015-7092.mp3.
292. Monk II, 855 F.3d at 1317.
293. 445 U.S. 388 (1980).
294. 569 U.S. 66 (2013).
295. Monk II, 855 F.3d at 1317.
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noted that another class member, Mr. Van Allen, moved to join Mr. Monk’s
proposed class (a motion denied by the CAVC), distinguishing the case
from Genesis, where no other individuals moved to join the class.296
Most significantly, the Federal Circuit recognized that sometimes a
class action is the only way to get an issue answered.297 A “class-action
claim is not necessarily moot upon the termination of the named
plaintiff’s claim” in circumstances in which “other persons similarly
situated will continue to be subject to the challenged conduct,” but
“the challenged conduct was effectively unreviewable, because no
plaintiff possessed a personal stake in the suit long enough for
litigation to run its course.”298 This is an important ruling in light of
the fact that veterans’ writ petitions, based upon unnecessary delay,
often become moot by the VA’s response to the writ.299
The Federal Circuit found that the authority for the use of the class
action device in CAVC proceedings existed in three ways: under the All
Writs Act; pursuant to the CAVC’s own enabling statutes; and by virtue of
the CAVC’s inherent powers.300 Each of these bases is discussed below.
First, concurring with the Second Circuit’s decision in United States
ex rel. Sero v. Preiser,301 the Federal Circuit reiterated that the All Writs
Act permits courts to create “appropriate modes of procedure, by
analogy to existing rules or otherwise in conformity with judicial
usage.”302 In this regard, the court explained that it could employ
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 analysis to determine whether class
certification is appropriate.303 The relevant factors found in the rule
include whether the class is so numerous that joinder of all members
is impracticable; whether common questions of law or fact exist;
whether the claims of the representative parties are typical for the class;
and whether the representative parties will fairly and adequately
protect the interest of the class.304 Recognizing that the CAVC’s
jurisdiction extends to “compel action of the Secretary unlawfully

296. Id.; See Symczyk, 569 U.S. at 70 (highlighting issues of conditional certification).
297. Monk II, 855 F.3d at 1320–21.
298. Symczyk, 569 U.S. at 75–76 (internal quotations omitted).
299. See Ebanks v. Shulkin, 877 F.3d 1037, 1040 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (noting that the
Federal Circuit later found class certification as an appropriate procedural device).
300. Monk II, 855 F.3d at 1318.
301. 506 F.2d 1115, 1125–26 (2d Cir. 1974).
302. Monk II, 855 F.3d at 1318–19.
303. Id. at 1319.
304. Id. (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 23).
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withheld or unreasonably delayed,”305 the Federal Circuit said it could
find “no principled reason why the [CAVC] cannot rely on the All
Writs Act to aggregate claims in aid of its jurisdiction.”306
Second, with regard to the CAVC’s own statutory authority, the
Federal Circuit noted that nothing in the Veterans Judicial Review Act
(VJRA) restricts the use of the class action device.307 Rather, 38 U.S.C.
§ 7264(a) grants express authority for the CAVC to create its own rules
necessary to exercise its jurisdiction.308 The court explained that, just
as the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and
bankruptcy courts have found ways to aggregate claims, the CAVC may
do so as well.309
Third, with regard to the final underpinning for CAVC authority to
entertain class actions, the Federal Circuit explained that the CAVC’s
enabling statutes do not, by their terms, preclude the class action
device.310 The CAVC debunked the statutory impediments highlighted
in its earlier decisions, including the provisions that the CAVC review
individual Board decisions following a notice of appeal, without a de
novo trial.311 Upon review of the jurisdictional statutes as a whole, the
CAVC found those provisions to be too limited.312 Again, the court
explained that § 7261 broadly grants the CAVC authority to “compel
action of the Secretary unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed.”313
Considering the CAVC’s statutory authority to craft its own rules, the
Federal Circuit found that the CAVC’s rule disallowing class actions
constituted an abuse of discretion.314 In balancing the CAVC’s
reasoning for categorically refusing to certify class actions, the Federal
Circuit identified significant potential benefits veterans would gain

305. 38 U.S.C. § 7261(a) (2012).
306. Monk II, 855 F.3d at 1319.
307. Id. at 1320
308. Id.
309. Id. at 1319–21.
310. Id. at 1320–22.
311. Id. at 1320.
312. Id. (commenting that the CAVC had identified three statutory impediments to
their authority to hear class actions in Harrison: (1) 38 U.S.C. § 7252 “limits the
jurisdiction of this Court to the review of [Board] decisions”; (2) 38 U.S.C. § 7261(c)
prohibits fact finding, stating “[i]n no event shall findings of fact . . . be subject to trial
de novo by the Court”; and (3) 38 U.S.C. § 7266 provides that “each person adversely
affected by such a [Board] decision must file a notice of appeal”) (alteration in original).
313. Id. at 1319.
314. Id. at 1318.
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through an aggregate claims process: efficiency, consistency, fairness,
and improvement of access to legal and expert assistance to those with
limited resources.315
The Federal Circuit’s decision recognizes the reality many veterans face
in the arduous VA appeal process. Recall that the VA granted Mr. Monk’s
disability claims with a one hundred percent rating during his appellate
process, arguably mooting his claim.316 This is not an atypical development.
Indeed, in the Monk II decision, the Federal Circuit points out that writs
challenging the VA’s delay in adjudicating appeals often evade judicial
review because the VA usually acts promptly to resolve mandamus
petitions.317 Citing CAVC Judges Lance and Hagel, the court said:
[W]hen the [CAVC] orders the VA to respond to a petition “set[ting]
forth a well-pleaded complaint that the processing of a claim has been
improperly delayed,” the “great majority of the time” the VA “responds
by correcting the problem within the short time allotted for a
response, and the petition is dismissed as moot because the relief
sought has been obtained.”318

Further, the court highlighted instances, raised by amicus curiae,
where the VA had granted full benefits to veterans whose claims were
scheduled for CAVC precedential review, while denying similarly
situated veterans benefits on the same grounds.319
C. Monk III
When the matter was remanded to the CAVC, Mr. Monk filed an
Amended Petition for Extraordinary Relief, deleting that portion of the
proposed class definition that limited the proposed class to those “veterans
facing financial or medical hardship.”320 The Amended Petition added
eight additional named representatives.321 On October 26, 2017, the CAVC
issued a per curiam order inviting amici participation and requesting
guidance on twelve discrete questions including, inter alia, whether Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 23 should be used as the model rule; how fact
finding will be conducted; and whether class relief is superior to a

315. Id. at 1320.
316. Id. at 1316.
317. Id. at 1320–21 (citing Young v. Shinseki, 25 Vet. App. 201, 215 (2012)).
318. Id. at 1321.
319. Id. (citing Brief for Am. Legion as Amici Curiae at 18–25, Monk v. Shulkin, 855
F.3d 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (Nos. 2015-7092; 2015-7106)).
320. Monk v. Wilkie (Monk III), 30 Vet. App. 167, 170 (2018).
321. Id.
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precedential decision.322 In response, the court received nine amicus
briefs.323 On August 23, 2018, the court, sitting en banc, ultimately denied
the requested class certification, issuing a split decision with four judges
supporting the order and four judges dissenting.324
The “crux” of the certification decision centered upon the commonality
element.325 Judge Schoelen, writing in favor of denying class certification,
noted that petitioners assert the length of time they have waited for
resolution of their pending appeals may vary and acknowledged petitioners’
contention that “this variance is unimportant so long as the wait is more than
[twelve] months.”326 The question, as simplified, nonetheless precluded class
certification because the petitioners’ legal theories required the court to
determine whether the VA’s delay was unreasonable.327 As to the
reasonableness question, Judge Schoelen explained that the court decides
whether any delay is unreasonable by examining the substantive claims
underlying their petition and the justification the VA offers for the
delay.328 Relying on the recent Martin case decided by the Federal Circuit,
Judge Schoelen noted that delay might be the result of “complete
inaction” by the VA or the VA’s statutory duty to assist a claimant in
developing the case.329 Whether the VA’s delay was reasonable is integral
to each of the petitioner’s claims and as a result, no commonality exists.330
Judge Davis concurred, stating:
[A] class must have claims that “depend on a common contention” that
is “capable of classwide resolution” such that a “determination of its
truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each
one of the claims in one stroke.” Here, there are countless different
reasons for processing time for each claim; therefore, one answer will
not resolve all claims. Significantly, claims processing time does not
necessarily mean, “delay.”331
322. Monk v. Shulkin, No. 15-1280, 2017 WL 4864521, at *1, *2 (Ct. Vet. App. Oct.
17, 2017) (per curiam).
323. General Docket, Monk v. Shulkin, 2017 WL 4864521 (Vet. App. 2017) (No. 15-1280).
324. Monk III, 30 Vet. App. at 169, 181, 184, 189. Judges Schoelen, Davis, Pietsch
and Meredith wrote that the commonality element ultimately defeated class
certification in the Monk context, while Judges Allen, Bartley, Toth and Greenberg
believed a class should have been certified. Id. at 181.
325. Id. at 175.
326. Id.
327. Id. at 176.
328. Id.
329. Id. at 177.
330. Id. at 182 (Davis, J., concurring).
331. Id.
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Judge Davis was not a VA apologist, stating five to seven years for
resolution of an appeal is “unreasonable.”332 He called for “radical
change” to address the 450,000 cases in the VA’s backlog.333 Radical
change includes, in his view, the following elements: “[f]inality, a
closed record, aggregate claims resolution, alternative dispute
resolution, and claims waivers for immediate cash payments.”334 Chief
Judge of the CAVC at the time of the opinion, he also noted the
historic significance of the Monk III case in the CAVC jurisprudence,
calling it a “seismic shift.”335
Judge Allen, writing for three judges who would grant class
certification, was undeterred by the individual questions raised by
Judge Schoelen, warning that not all merits questions must be resolved
in the class certification analysis.336 Using a boat analogy, he wrote:
Assume that each class member’s claim is a small boat floating on
the water in a pool. The commonality inquiry (for this metaphorical
pool) is trained on whether there is a single action that will cause
the pool to drain or fill such that all the boats will move together. If
there is, there is commonality among the boats because there is a
single action that affects them all “in one stroke.”337

Judge Allen identified the “fundamental problem with the plurality’s
reasoning” as the failure to apprehend the theory of the case presented
by petitioners: “[t]heir theory is that there is a period of time that is
simply too long for a claimant to wait for a decision.”338
Judge Greenberg wrote separately stating, “‘courts may not abdicate
their role and deny any effective remedy’ to victims of administrative
delay simply ‘because the problem is difficult.’”339 He asserted the CAVC
always had jurisdiction to determine class actions, prior to Monk I, and
any limitations have been self-imposed by the CAVC itself.340 Citing
Justice Ginsburg’s dissent in Wal-Mart, Judge Greenberg states the
CAVC must act as the “glue” in the fractured VA adjudicatory system.341

332.
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.
339.
340.
341.

Id. at 181–82.
Id. at 182.
Id.
Id. at 184.
Id. at 190 (Allen, J., concurring in part).
Id. at 191.
Id. at 194.
Id. at 201 (Greenberg, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted).
Id.
Id. at 202.
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Despite the differing (and entertaining) opinions in the remanded
Monk III case, all judges agreed that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23
would be the appropriate model for a class action rule in the CAVC in
the future.342 The case is now on appeal again at the Federal Circuit at
the time of this writing, as is the dismissal of the putative class
members’ individual claims for extraordinary relief.343
D. Class Actions in the CAVC Following Monk
As noted above, the CAVC determined it will use aggregate resolution
procedures in appropriate cases initiated by a petition. Notwithstanding
the denial of class certification in the Monk case, the CAVC has certified
three classes at the time of this writing.
The first class action certified by the CAVC was Godsey v. Wilkie, in
which the issue again was undue delay.344 In contrast to Monk, the court
limited the Godsey class to a single segment of the appeals process
involving a pure ministerial action by the VA—the time it takes the VA
to “certify” a case to the Board following receipt of the Form 9.345
Before February 19, 2019, a claimant dissatisfied with a VA benefits
decision could appeal that decision to the Board by filing a NOD and,
ultimately, a Substantive Appeal, using a Form 9.346 Once a claimant
files a Form 9, the VA would “certify” the case and transfer the
appellate record to the Board with a Form 8.347
In 2017, when the Godsey petition was filed, it took the VA, on average,
773 days to certify a case to the Board after receiving a Form 9 and an
additional 321 days after that to transfer the record to the Board.348
The Godsey petitioners asserted the three-year timespan was so
unreasonable that it amounted to a deprivation, which stripped them

342. The author is on the CAVC’s Rules Advisory Committee and the Committee has
been charged with creating the Rule to be adopted as part of the Court’s Rules of Practice.
343. On October 23, 2019, the CAVC denied the remaining claims in Monk finding
the individual claims of all named representatives other than Dolphin were withdrawn
or moot. See Monk v. Wilkie (Monk IV), 32 Vet. App. 87, 108 (2019). As to Mr. Dolphin,
the CAVC (with Judges Allen and Greenberg dissenting) found that under the TRAC
factors, no unreasonable delay existed. Id. Judge Pietsch dissented because of concerns
with jurisdiction. Id. at 117.
344. Godsey v. Wilkie, 31 Vet. App. 207, 215 (2019).
345. Id.
346. Id. at 213–14 (referencing 38 U.S.C. § 7105(a) (2012)).
347. See id. at 216 (explaining the VA’s application of the certification process
established in 38 C.F.R. § 19.35 (2018)).
348. Id.
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of their constitutional right to due process.349 They requested class
certification and an order compelling the VA Secretary to expedite the
appeals certification and transfer process.350
The CAVC agreed, although it modified the proposed class to those
veterans waiting more than eighteen months.351 It also granted the
extraordinary relief in the same decision, ordering the Secretary to
certify cases within 120 days or take other action to develop the veteran’s
claim.352 The CAVC made clear that by adjudicating the merits and the
class decision at the same time in Godsey was not the adoption of a
general policy for deciding such matters concurrently in future cases.353
However, given the unique circumstances surrounding the Godsey case,
particularly the nature of the alleged injury and the need for rapid
remedial action, the CAVC resolved both matters in a single order.354
The second class action certified by the CAVC was Wolfe v. Wilkie,355
in which the CAVC certified a class of veterans asserting entitlement to
reimbursement for emergency medical expenses at non-VA facilities.356
The Wolfe case came with a complex procedural background including
an earlier CAVC opinion in Staab v. McDonald,357 which found that the
Secretary’s implementing regulations relating to these reimbursements
were contrary to law.358 The CAVC’s frustration was palpable, and the
opinion read as a stinging rebuke to the agency. The CAVC admonished
the VA for misleading veterans into believing they were not entitled to
reimbursements and for implementing regulations directly contrary to
the court’s ruling.359

349. Id. at 214.
350. Id.
351. Id. at 221–22.
352. Id. at 230.
353. Id. at 224–25.
354. Judge Pietsch dissented, citing her concerns about the lack of any class action
rules in place at the CAVC. Id. at 231 (Pietsch, J., dissenting). With regard to the merits,
Judge Pietsch determined that VA is well aware of the delays and she would “let the
Secretary run his agency.” Id. at 233.
355. 32 Vet. App. 1, 11 (2019).
356. Id. at 12.
357. 28 Vet. App. 50, 55 (2016) (holding that congressional intent required veterans to
be reimbursed for emergency medical costs not covered by third-party insurer).
358. Wolfe, 32 Vet. App. at 11–12 (expressing condemnation for the Secretary’s postStaab regulations).
359. Id.
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The CAVC certified the class proposed by petitioner, which included
veterans whose claims were or would be denied.360 It held the regulation
found in 38 C.F.R. § 17.1005(a)(5) unlawful, required readjudication of
affected claims, and ordered the VA to send corrective letters to veterans.361
The third class action certified by the CAVC is Skaar v. Wilkie.362 In this
case, the CAVC certified a class of veterans who served in Palomeres,
Spain and were exposed to radiation arising from a midair collision in
1966.363 The merits of the class action involved presumptions relating to
radiogenic diseases. With regard to the class certification analysis, the
CAVC narrowed the proposed class definition which included an array
of veterans whose claims spanned the adjudication process: from those
who had never filed a claim to those who never appealed a denial.364
After modifying the class definition365 and limiting the claim to a
single regulatory challenge, the CAVC used Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23 as its model, engaging in the common Rule 23(a)
analysis including the requirements of numerosity, commonalty,
typicality and adequacy.366 The CAVC found that injunctive relief was
proper, and that class action device was the superior method for
litigating the claim.367 Notably, the CAVC created a presumption
against class certification because of its ability to render binding
precedential decisions.368
Presumptions, by definition, can be overcome and the majority in
Skaar identified several none-exclusive factors that advocates should
consider in the request for class certification.369 The judicially created
presumption can be overcome by showing, with a preponderance of the
evidence, the following factors which weigh in favor of certification:

360. Id.
361. Id. at 40. But see id. at 42 (Falvey, J., dissenting) (finding that a writ was unnecessary).
362. 32 Vet. App. 156 (2019).
363. Id. at 167.
364. Id. at 179–80.
365. The majority in Skaar found that Palomeres veterans who had not timely
appealed decisions were not part of the class, as equitable tolling would not apply. Id.
at 186–90 (explaining that they could later file supplemental claims if needed). Judge
Schoelen, in her concurrence, would have allowed the past and expired subgroups but
she would exclude “future” claimants. Id. at 203–06 (Schoelen, J., concurring in part).
366. Id. at 189-94.
367. Id. at 189–95.
368. Id. at 196.
369. Id. at 197.
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the challenge is collateral to a claim for benefits (in Skaar, this
factor was met because the challenge involved VA’s adherence
to a regulation, not interference with agency process with regard
to his particular claim)
the litigation of the challenge involves compiling a complex
factual record (in Skaar, this was technical and scientific
information about dosage requirements and processes)
the appellate record is sufficiently developed to permit judicial
review of the challenged conduct (in Skaar, the record was
complete because the challenge was to the compliance with the
regulation, in contrast to a determination as to the proper
dosage methodology which would not be suitable for class
certification because of the lack of record); and
the putative class has alleged sufficient facts suggesting a need
for remedial enforcement (in Skaar, the advanced age and
radiogenic disease supported this factor).370

These factors are weighted equally and on a case-by-case basis.371
In her concurrence in part, Judge Schoelen suggested an additional
two factors to consider: (1) whether the challenge involves complex
technical or scientific matters, and (2) whether the conduct is
“systemic,” meaning a significant number of claims involve the issue.372
Judges Falvey, Pietsch, and Meredith dissented, questioning the
necessity and efficacy of class certification given the CAVC’s authority
to issue precedential decisions which bind the VA.373 The dissent urged
that class actions are only appropriate in appeals (as opposed to
petitions for a writ) where there is a final Board decision.374 The dissent
also asserted that as an additional jurisdictional matter, the class
certification decision must be made only upon the record before the
agency and the evidence used by the majority in its analysis was not
part of that record.375 In sum, the dissent criticized the majority’s
unnecessary “legal innovation” beyond the power granted by Congress,
when a precedential decision would have had the same result.376

370.
371.
372.
373.
374.
375.
376.

Id. at 197–99.
Id. at 197.
Id. at 207–08 (Schoelen, J., concurring in part).
Id. at 208–09 (Falvey, J., dissenting).
Id. at 209.
Id. at 216–19.
Id. at 224–25.
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Over the past few years and with the urging and guidance of the
Federal Circuit, we have seen the legal landscape for veterans change.
Unreasonable delay, the bane of veterans nationwide, can be
addressed by writs, which should be analyzed under a revamped
standard, as described in Martin. Unreasonable delay can also be
addressed on a class-wide basis, as established in Godsey.
With regard to class actions raising issues other than delay, a path
has been revealed in Skaar. Although Skaar adds an impediment to
class certification by virtue of the new presumption against class
certification and the additional multifactor analysis, the CAVC’s
acknowledgement of the importance of the class action device in
veterans cases is the “seismic” change first noted by Judge Davis in
Monk III. In Skaar, the CAVC acknowledged that the class action device
can address “repetitive wrongdoing,” improve access to justice, prevent
the VA’s mooting of claims scheduled for precedential review and
correct systemic errors.377 This is all good news for veterans advocates
who continue to argue for meaningful advances under the law for
veterans, on behalf of a grateful nation.378
VII. EQUITABLE REMEDIES
The Federal Circuit has reviewed many cases surrounding equitable
remedies in the past decade, since Henderson v. Shinseki.379 In Henderson,
the Court found the 120-day notice of appeal deadline applicable to
cases filed with the CAVC lacked jurisdictional attributes, and,
therefore, a failure to meet that deadline did not have the same strict
consequences.380 Specifically, the Supreme Court found that this filing
was not jurisdictional, and thus, the CAVC could toll the 120-day
statute of limitations when equity demanded.381 The Court focused
heavily on the pro-veteran slant of the federal veterans benefits laws..382

377. Id. at 179.
378. Abraham Lincoln famously stated in his second inaugural address that the
nation would “care for him who shall have borne the battle, and for his widow, and his
orphan.” This promise to serve and honor the men and women who are America’s
veterans has become the mission of the VA. U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFS., About VA,
Mission, Vision, Core Values & Goals, https://www.va.gov/about_va/mission.asp
[https://www.va.gov/about_va/mission.asp] (last updated Aug. 20, 2015).
379. 562 U.S. 428 (2011).
380. Id.
381. Id. at 434, 441.
382. Id. at 431, 437–38.
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Similar to Henderson, in James v. Wilkie,383 the Federal Circuit reviewed
equitable tolling principles applicable to an untimely notice of appeal.384
In Burris v. Wilkie,385 the Court considered whether the CAVC may grant
equitable relief claims under 38 U.S.C. § 503.386
A. James Requires the CAVC to Provide More Analysis to Untimely Notice of
Appeals
The question presented in James was whether the CAVC applied the
proper legal standard when reviewing the extraordinary circumstances
requirement in equitable tolling cases.387 Mr. Charles James placed his
notice of appeal (NOA) in the mailbox, with the mailbox flag up within
the 120-day deadline required by statute to appeal a Board decision to
the CAVC.388 However, for unknown reasons, the NOA did not get
picked up by United States Postal Service.389
Under Checo, in order to benefit from equitable tolling, an appellant
must demonstrate extraordinary circumstances, due diligence, and
causation.390 The Supreme Court requires a flexible case-by-case
analysis.391 In James, the Federal Circuit determined that the CAVC
failed to perform a proper analysis.392 The Federal Circuit found that
the CAVC’s categorical conclusion that equitable tolling can never
apply to a case involving a fallen mailbox flag is wrong.393 The Federal
Circuit found that the CAVC failed to consider whether the fallen
mailbox flag was due to an alleged third-party interference with the
federal collection of mail and whether this circumstance could justify
equitable tolling.394 Additionally, the Federal Circuit found that it was
irrelevant as to whether Mr. James could have done more to file his

383. 917 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
384. Id. at 1370.
385. 888 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
386. Id. at 1356–58 (rejecting Petitioner’s argument that the CAVC itself can grant
equitable relief and holding that only the Secretary may do so).
387. James, 917 F.3d at 1370 (remanding the case back to the CAVC so the proper
legal standard could be applied).
388. Id.
389. Id.
390. Id. at 1372–73 (citing Checo v. Shinseki, 748 F.3d 1373, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2014)).
391. Id. at 1373 (pointing out the need for even greater flexibility when
adjudicating veterans’ claims).
392. Id.
393. Id.
394. Id. at 1374.
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NOA, in terms of the extraordinary circumstances element.395 On
remand, the CAVC granted equitable tolling in Mr. James’s case.396
B. Federal Circuit Agrees That the CAVC Does Not Have Jurisdiction Under
38 U.S.C. § 503 to Grant Monetary Relief
The question presented in Burris is whether the CAVC, itself, has
jurisdiction to grant equitable relief.397 Burris is a consolidated case of
Charles Burris and Ben Thompson.398
Under 38 U.S.C. § 503, the VA Secretary may pay out benefits if there
is administrative error or a finding that a person detrimentally relied
upon a determination of the VA, without knowledge that it was
erroneously made.399 In the Burris case, the appellant’s father was
granted permanent and total disability, effective October 1, 2000.400
This grant of benefits entitled Mr. Burris to Dependents Education
Assistance (“DEA”) benefits.401 In 2010, the appellant requested the
benefits from 2002 to 2004.402 However, the VA denied the claim
because the costs were over one year old.403 Under statutes and
regulations, this was a proper determination by the VA.404 The CAVC
found that it was without jurisdiction to grant equitable relief.405
In Ben Thompson’s case, the veteran was entitled to forty-eight
months of education.406 As of May 2011, he had used forty-four months
and twenty-two days.407 In July 2011, Thompson received two
notifications from the VA regarding his education eligibility.408 In the
first notice, the VA told him he had three months and eight days left
remaining.409 In the second notice, the VA told him he had thirty-six
395. Id. at 1375.
396. Order Granting Equitable Tolling, James v. Wilkie, No. 16-1948 (Vet. App.
June 27, 2019).
397. Burris v. Wilkie, 888 F.3d 1352, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
398. Id. at 1354.
399. Id. at 1358.
400. Id. at 1354.
401. Id.
402. Id.
403. Id.
404. Id. at 1359–62 (discussing the problems that would arise if the relevant statutes
were interpreted differently).
405. Id. at 1354.
406. Id. at 1355.
407. Id.
408. Id.
409. Id.
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months of education remaining.410 Relying on the second notice, Mr.
Thompson transferred the remainder of his eligibility to his son to
attend a more expensive school than the two he was considering.411
The VA refused to provide the thirty-six months of benefits and the
Board affirmed.412 Thompson requested equitable relief from the VA
Secretary; however, the Secretary denied the request.413 He then
appealed to the CAVC and the Federal Circuit.414
The Federal Circuit determined that the CAVC does not have
authority to outright grant monetary relief to veterans.415 The Federal
Circuit found that Congress gave the VA Secretary the exclusive
discretionary authority to provide this relief.416 Sadly for veterans, there
is no judicial remedy where the VA Secretary refuses equitable relief.
VIII. EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT DECISIONS
28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) awards attorney’s fees and expenses to a
prevailing party in litigation against the United States where the position
of the United States was not substantially justified.417 This statute is titled
the Equal Access to Justice Act418 (EAJA). Several decades of case law,
discussed below, have refined the definition of a “prevailing party” and
the circumstances under which EAJA fees may be awarded.
A party does not need to obtain a final judgment in his or her favor
in order to be a “prevailing party,” according to the Supreme Court’s
decision in CRST Van Expedited, Inc. v. E.E.O.C.419 (CRST), the
“touchstone of the prevailing party inquiry must be the material
alteration of the legal relationship of the parties.”420 As a further
refinement of the “prevailing party” status for EAJA awards, the Federal
Circuit found that when a case is remanded back to an agency without
a judicial finding of error or an acknowledgment of error by the

410. Id.
411. Id.
412. Id.
413. Id.
414. Id.
415. Id. at 1360.
416. Id.
417. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (2012).
418. Id.
419. 136 S. Ct. 1642, 1646 (2016).
420. Id. (citing Tex. State Teachers Ass’n. v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782,
792–93 (1989)).
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agency, there is no prevailing party for EAJA purposes.421 In 2018, the
Federal Circuit decided two important cases providing further definition to
the term “prevailing party,” Winters v. Wilkie422 and Robinson v. O’Rourke.423
A. Winters v. Wilkie
The Appellant, Mrs. Regina Winters, substituted herself into her
husband’s claim for disability compensation when he passed away.424
The Board of Veterans’ Appeals denied her husband’s underlying
claims in 2013 and her attorney submitted what may have been
considered a motion for revision of the Board decision.425 The Board
did not consider the motion as a request for revision but instead
referred the issues to the lower agency regional office for review.426 In
sending the request to the regional office, the Board never informed
Mrs. Winters that they did not consider her motion a motion for
review.427 Because the Board failed to provide Mrs. Winters notice of
this final decision that her letter did not constitute a motion for
reconsideration, her 120-day window to appeal the Board’s decision to
the CAVC never began to run.428
In 2014, the Board denied other claims in Mrs. Winters’s case and
she appealed both the 2013 and 2014 Board decisions to the CAVC.429
The CAVC dismissed the 2013 appeal because the court found it did
not have jurisdiction due to the Board’s failure to issue a final decision
regarding those claims.430 Finding that the 2013 and 2014 issues were
inextricably intertwined, the CAVC remanded both sets of claims back
to the Board for decision.431
Mrs. Winters’s attorney filed a petition with the CAVC for EAJA fees
based upon the court’s remand of the issues back to the agency.432 The
CAVC rejected the petition regarding the 2013 claims because the

421.
422.
423.
424.
425.
426.
427.
428.
429.
430.
431.
432.

Davis v. Nicholson, 475 F.3d 1360, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
898 F.3d 1377, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
891 F.3d 976, 978 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
Winters, 898 F.3d at 1379.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1380.
Id.
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court did not have jurisdiction over these issues in the first place.433 The
court then dismissed the petition regarding the 2014 claims finding that
Mrs. Winters was not a “prevailing party” because the remand of the 2014
claims was not due to administrative error in the 2014 decision.434
In her appeal to the Federal Circuit, Mrs. Winters argued that the
CAVC remand was partially based on the Board’s premature decision
on the 2014 claims which constituted an error.435 The Federal Circuit
held that Mrs. Winters failed to meet the burden of demonstrating that
there was error in the 2014 decision noting that “a boxer thrown out
of the ring and then allowed back in to continue the fight has not
prevailed.”436 There is no law requiring the Board to decide the issues
in any certain order, and Mrs. Winters failed to demonstrate a material
alteration in the legal relationship of the parties under CRST.437 The
remand was based solely upon judicial economy and no error on the
part of the agency was shown.438
The decision in Winters reinforces the court’s previous decisions that
remand alone is not enough to warrant EAJA fees.
B. Robinson v. O’Rourke
On appeal to the CAVC, Mr. Bennie Robinson’s counsel, who also
represented Mr. Robinson at the agency level, argued an issue for the
first time that ended up in a favorable decision for Mr. Robinson.439
The CAVC did not apply the doctrine of issue exhaustion and did not
identify any error on the part of the Board but set aside the Board
decision and remanded the case so that the Board could address the
new arguments brought up on appeal.440 Mr. Robinson’s attorney filed
a petition for EAJA fees arguing that the remand indicated Mr.
Robinson was a “prevailing party.”441 The CAVC denied the application
because the remand was not predicated on Board error but upon the

433.
434.
435.
436.
437.
438.
439.
440.
441.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1382.
Id. at 1384 (citing Akers v. Nicholson, 409 F.3d 1356, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2005)).
Id.
Id.
Robinson v. O’Rourke, 891 F.3d 976, 978 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
Id.
Id. at 979.
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new arguments of the attorney.442 The court reiterated that a remand
alone does not grant prevailing party status.443
The Federal Circuit noted that the Supreme Court’s 2016 decision in
CRST did not concern a remand to an agency but instead dealt with
defendants—not plaintiffs—who prevailed.444 Because of this difference,
the court commented that it is unclear if reconsideration or clarification of
previous precedent at the Federal Circuit regarding agency remands will be
necessary in the future.445 The court found that no decision regarding
CRST’s impact was necessary in Mr. Robinson’s case because the remand
was not predicated on agency error and did not result in a material
alteration of the relationship between the parties.446 The court noted:
Robinson’s position in this appeal would reward a claimant for
raising an argument for the first time at the [CAVC]. Such a result
is illogical and contrary to fundamental principles of orderly
procedure and good administration. While “[w]e recognize that
EAJA is an important component of the framework within which
veterans may seek benefits,” . . . we do not interpret the statute in a
manner that incentivizes claimants to withhold arguments before
the Board, or, alternatively, that requires the Board or [CAVC] to
sua sponte search for and address issues that may be lurking in the
record but that have not been briefed.447

In Robinson, the Federal Circuit left open the question of whether
the precedential holdings regarding remands back to the agency level
should be reexamined in light of the Supreme Court’s 2016 CRST
decision. Limiting EAJA fees in decisions remanding cases back to the
agency due to administrative error could have catastrophic effects on
veterans and their advocates, particularly because remand is the most
utilized resolution when the CAVC determines there was agency error.448
Often, EAJA fees are the only fees attorneys earn in cases representing
veterans in an environment where twenty-six percent of veterans who file at

442. Id.
443. Id.
444. Id. at 982.
445. Id.
446. Id.
447. Id. at 986.
448. Many CAVC cases are remanded based upon a “joint motion to remand” in
which the VA Secretary, through counsel, agrees an error was made. See, e.g., CAVC
Rule 33. In these cases, there should be no question that an EAJA fee is proper given
the concession of an error.
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the CAVC are pro se.449 It will be important to watch the Federal Circuit’s
consideration and implementation of CRST in the coming years.
CONCLUSION
Over the past four years, the Federal Circuit has dramatically
changed CAVC procedural rules, administrative law principles, and
overturned decades of case law. Each of the decisions discussed above
will have a substantial impact on the teaching and practice of veterans
law, specifically with regard to administrative law principles and
procedural possibilities.
Given that the United States is still engaged in its longest war to date,
the War on Terror currently being waged in Iraq and Afghanistan,
veterans will continue to benefit from the able assistance of counsel. As
important, judicial review of VA actions is necessary so that our veterans
receive all of their earned benefits. In light of the seismic changes
discussed above, affecting hundreds of thousands of veterans, the need
for informed and effective counsel to help our nation’s veterans seek
the disability benefits they have earned is of utmost importance.

449. U.S. CT. OF APP. FOR VETERANS CLAIMS, ANN. REP. 1 (2018), http://www.
uscourts.cavc.gov/documents/FY2018AnnualReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/N9VW-7JQQ].

